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ON TIME, (IN)EQUALITY, AND DEATH
Fred O. Smith, Jr.*
In recent years, American institutions have inadvertently encountered the
bodies of former slaves with increasing frequency. Pledges of respect are common features of these discoveries, accompanied by cultural debates about what
“respect” means. Often embedded in these debates is an intuition that there is
something special about respecting the dead bodies, burial sites, and images of
victims of mass, systemic horrors. This Article employs legal doctrine, philosophical insights, and American history to both interrogate and anchor this intuition.
Law can inform these debates because we regularly turn to legal settings to
resolve disputes about the dead. Yet the passage of time, systemic dehumanization, and changing egalitarian norms all complicate efforts to apply traditional legal considerations to disputes about victims of subordination. While,
for example, courts usually consult decedents’ expressed intentions to resolve
disputes, how do we divine the wishes of people who died centuries ago, under
a legal system designed to negate and dishonor their intentions? How do we
honor relationships like kinship for people who were routinely and forcibly separated from their kin? And how do we assess the motives or culpability of institutions that, in prior generations, were complicit in profound horrors, but
now pledge honor and respect?
This Article offers a theory of time and equality to help guide cultural and legal
debates about the treatment of dead victims of mass horror. On this account,
we can become complicit in past, systemic subordination by dishonoring the
memories of victims. Systemic neglect and exploitation of a group’s bodies and
images can diminish the role of that group in shaping our national memory.
And if it is wrong to deny a person the ability to leave a legacy on account of
race under contemporary egalitarian norms, then we ought not engage in posthumous acts against the enslaved and other systemically debased persons that
perpetually rob them of such a legacy.

* Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. Thanks are due to participants
in the faculty workshops at the following law schools: the University of California, Irvine; the
University of Chicago; Columbia University; Duke University; Loyola University, Los Angeles;
and the University of Texas. I am deeply grateful to Richard Banks, Dorothy Brown, Adam Chilton, Mary Dudziak, Don Herzog, Timothy Holbrook, Daniel LaChance, Mai-Linh Hong, Lee
Kovarsky, Genevieve Lakier, Matthew Lawrence, Everett Long, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Melissa Murray, Martha Nussbaum, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Mar Kidvai Padilla, Charlie
Paine, Rafael I. Pardo, Elizabeth Reese, Alix Rogers, Jennifer Rothman, Margaret A. Schilt, Fred
O. Smith, Sr., Norm Spaulding, and Mark Zachary Taylor for their engagement with drafts and
the underpinning ideas. Excellent research assistance was provided by Natalie Cascario, Laura
Flint, Andrea Galvez, and Shawn Ren.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no place you or I can go, to think about or not think about, to summon the
presences of, or recollect the absences of slaves . . . . There is no suitable memorial or
plaque or wreath or wall or park or skyscraper lobby. There’s no 300-foot tower.
There’s no small bench by the road.
Toni Morrison 1
They were mistreated as slaves, and now they are mistreated in death.
Fred O. Smith, Sr. 2
For the survivor who chooses to testify, it is clear: his duty is to bear witness for the
dead and for the living. He has no right to deprive future generations of a past that
belongs to our collective memory. To forget would be not only dangerous but offensive; to forget the dead would be akin to killing them a second time.
Elie Wiesel 3

Physical manifestations of horrors perpetrated long ago stalk the present. 4
During the Trump Administration, fierce debates raged in Arizona and Texas

1. Toni Morrison, A Bench by the Road, WORLD, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 4, 4 [perma.cc/EKP5U8DS].
2. Sophia Choi, Pipe Found Near Possible Slave Remains at UGA, WSB-TV (Mar. 28,
2017, 7:25 PM), https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/pipe-found-near-possible-slave-remainsat-uga/506876978 [perma.cc/D4TN-AMFD].
3. ELIE WIESEL, NIGHT, at xv (Marion Wiesel trans., Hill & Wang 2006) (1958).
4. Cf. Letter from James Madison to Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette (Nov. 25,
1820), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, RETIREMENT SERIES: 1 FEBRUARY 1820–26
FEBRUARY 1823, at 158, 159 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Mary Parke Johnson & Anne Mandeville Colony eds., 2013) (referring to slavery as America’s “original sin”); Maggie Blackhawk,
Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1800 (2019)
(“[L]ike America’s other original sin, traces of America’s history with colonialism are woven in
like threads to the fabric of the document.”).
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about the federal government’s plans to destroy burial sites of Native Americans and enslaved persons. 5 Moreover, enslaved persons’ bodies have frequently been encountered across the United States in recent decades. 6 These
bodies sometimes hide in plain sight, as with the skulls of Cuban slaves that
were on display at the University of Pennsylvania until 2020. 7 More often,
they are disturbed inadvertently. 8 Pledges of respect are common features of
5. See, e.g., Laurel Morales, Border Wall Would Cut Across Land Sacred to Native Tribe,
NPR (Feb. 23, 2017, 4:35 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/23/516477313/border-wall-wouldcut-across-land-sacred-to-native-tribe [perma.cc/Z47F-ZGRX]; Melissa del Bosque, Trump’s
Border Wall Would Destroy Historic Gravesites in South Texas, INTERCEPT (Jan. 21, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/21/border-wall-gravesites-cemetery-texas [perma.cc/5NKFD9SY]; Native Burial Sites Blown Up for US Border Wall, BBC (Feb. 10, 2020), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51449739 [perma.cc/5WSW-8KB6]. The events prompted
multiple lawsuits. E.g., La Posta Band of Diegueño Mission Indians v. Trump, No. 20-cv-01552,
2020 WL 7398763, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2020); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump, 453
F. Supp. 3d 11, 28 (D.D.C. 2020). Another recent lawsuit alleges that the executive order creating
the border wall violates the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Original Complaint at 57–59, Zapata Cnty. v. Trump, No. 20-cv-106 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2020).
6. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Dig Unearths Early Black Burial Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/09/nyregion/dig-unearths-early-black-burial-ground.html
[perma.cc/MCD5-425D]; Amy Quinton, Black Burial Site Paved Over in Portsmouth, N.H., NPR
(Feb. 22, 2006, 11:17 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5228067
[perma.cc/8DTN-P4QL]; Mai-Linh K. Hong, “Get Your Asphalt Off My Ancestors!”: Reclaiming
Richmond’s African Burial Ground, 13 LAW CULTURE & HUMANS. 81, 83 (2017); Robert Hull,
University Cemetery Survey Yields More Grave Shafts; Commemoration Panel Formed, UVA
TODAY (Dec. 3, 2012), https://news.virginia.edu/content/university-cemetery-survey-yields-moregrave-shafts-commemoration-panel-formed [perma.cc/KF7R-9EJA]; Kevin McGill, As Shell Preserves Louisiana Slave Burial Ground, Question Persists: Where Are the Rest?, ADVOCATE (June
14, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_5a1ab0fa-6fdb11e8-b6d6-932aad7138e2.html [perma.cc/QCF6-5VUX]; Megan Mittelhammer, Everything
You Need to Know About the Baldwin Hall Controversy, RED & BLACK (May 4, 2021),
https://www.redandblack.com/news/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-baldwin-hallcontroversy/article_fff28aa0-bf0a-11e9-9256-4f177f5f318c.html [perma.cc/GQ87-M6VY]; Alice Goulding, U. Will Enlist Expert to Investigate African American Burial Ground Found Under
Penn Property, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Apr. 18, 2018, 10:32 PM), https://www.thedp.com/article/2018/04/african-american-burial-ground-west-philadelphia-upenn-penn-expert-university-philadelphia [perma.cc/4WYZ-HNV2]; Michaela Winberg, Philly’s Black Burial Grounds and the
Battle for Preservation, BILLY PENN (Mar. 24, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://billypenn.com/2019/03/24
/phillys-black-burial-grounds-and-the-battle-for-preservation [perma.cc/QD4H-QAE6]; Emma
Claybrook, Burial Ground for Dozens of Slaves Discovered at AR Church, PHILA. TRIB. (Nov. 18,
2019), https://www.phillytrib.com/news/across_america/burial-ground-for-dozens-of-slaves-discovered-at-ar-church/article_b774f27e-7082-55e0-8adc-3d873c611dd8.html [perma.cc/JG86-JGQF];
Melissa Lemieux, Florida Country Club Discovered 40 Slave Graves Buried Under Its Property, So
What Happens Now?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 26, 2019, 10:44 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/florida-country-club-discovered-40-slave-graves-buried-under-its-property-so-what-happens-now1479305 [perma.cc/W7XY-46DB]; Possible Slave Cemetery Found on Georgia College Campus,
AL.COM (May 13, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.al.com/news/2019/05/possible-slave-cemetery-found-on-georgia-college-campus.html [perma.cc/3AQ6-YJCG].
7. Nora McGreevy, The Penn Museum Moves Collection of Enslaved People’s Skulls into Storage, SMITHSONIAN (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/after-outcrypenn-museum-removes-skulls-enslaved-people-public-view-180975466 [perma.cc/RU5A-73E9].
8. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 6.
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these discoveries, accompanied by cultural debates about what respect
means. 9 When a slave cemetery was discovered at the University of Georgia,
a prominent Georgia political leader reminded the public: “They were owned
in life, but UGA doesn’t own them in death.” 10
The topic of posthumous interests is not new. Indeed, it has long pervaded
legal doctrine. Over a century ago, Justice Joseph Lumpkin III of the Georgia
Supreme Court observed that “the law—that rule of action which touches all
human things—must touch also this thing of death.” 11 And while the jurist
offered that observation in an opinion about whether a railroad company’s
negligence caused the disfigurement of a corpse, 12 the statement is no less apt
with respect to death’s less corporeal, more metaphysical dimensions. Even
after life’s final hour, important legal questions about human dignity, creations, reputation, will, and equality abound. 13 Law confronts these questions
by means of torts, 14 contracts, 15 trusts and estates, 16 intellectual property, 17

9. When the University of Virginia discovered remains of slaves, it committed to “assure
respect for the remains of those buried,” and “to memorialize these graves in as respectful manner as possible.” Hull, supra note 6. This was also the approach when, in 1991, a slave burial site
was discovered during the construction of a courthouse in New York City. A government official
pledged that it was “absolutely essential that the remains that were found on the site be treated
with the utmost respect and dignity.” Dunlap, supra note 6.
10. Blake Aued, Black Leaders Criticize UGA over Slave Graves at Baldwin Hall, FLAGPOLE
(Mar. 4, 2017), https://flagpole.com/news/in-the-loop/2017/03/04/black-leaders-criticize-ugaover-slave-graves-at-baldwin-hall [perma.cc/X29N-R3PD]. The author of the statement was Michael Thurmond, Georgia’s former labor commissioner and the current chief executive of the
state’s fourth most populous county. Mark Niesse, Mike Thurmond Wins DeKalb County CEO
Race, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/mikethurmond-wins-dekalb-county-ceo-race/IothDnqv1IfymWkHXgR3uO [perma.cc/XP65-S33H].
11. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905).
12. Id. at 24.
13. See DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES
(2008); Fred O. Smith, Jr., The Constitution After Death, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2020) (discussing ways that law protects and undermines dignity, reputational interests, creations, will,
equality, and spirituality after death); DON HERZOG, DEFAMING THE DEAD (2017) (assessing
ways that American law inadequately protects reputational interests after death); RAY D. MADOFF,
IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD (2010) (describing
the legal interests of the dead and contending that these legal protections have unduly accreted
over time).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1979).
15. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(g) (West 2017).
16. See, e.g., Wright v. Zeigler, 1 Ga. 324, 346 (1846); Burton v. Yeldell, 30 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich.
Eq.) 9, 15 (Ct. App. 1856); see also Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 666 (Mo. 1910) (identifying a
“right to testamentary disposition”).
17. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 1:3, at 4–5 (2021 ed. 2021); 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (permitting the copyrighting of works
created before 1978 for up to ninety-five years after the death of an author).
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criminal law, 18 freedom of information, 19 civil procedure, 20 evidentiary
rules, 21 constitutional law, 22 and even antidiscrimination law. 23 Law, therefore, regularly depends on an accounting of posthumous interests. 24 Sometimes, courts are asked to decide whether an alleged offense against a deceased
person was “outrageous,” 25 “[un]reasonable,” 26 or “reckless.” 27 Other times,
courts must balance interests of the living against the dignitary, reputational,
or privacy interests of the dead. In these cases, courts ask whether the reason
for a disturbance of the decedent’s interests are “adequa[te]” or “compelling.” 28 In other instances, it is policymakers who explicitly or implicitly engage in this type of balancing. Policymakers determine which lawsuits survive
the death of a party, for example. 29 And more broadly, they create statutory
and regulatory mandates that govern the treatment of cemeteries, human remains, images, estates, reputations, and personal information. 30
Despite the important legal contexts in which these assessments take
place, there is limited legal commentary about how to weigh posthumous legal
interests as a class. 31 Those who have written about posthumous legal interests
18. See IDAHO CODE § 18-4801 (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6103 (Supp. 2019); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.510 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01
(2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 771 (2020); see also 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL
LAW § 524, at 182–83 (15th ed. 1996).
19. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168–69 (2004).
20. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588–90 (1978).
21. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
22. Smith, supra note 13.
23. Mark E. Wojcik, Discrimination After Death, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 389, 390 (2000); Long
v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass’n, 278 P.2d 945, 946 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); People ex rel.
Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 101 N.E. 219, 220–21 (Ill. 1913); Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l
Park Cemetery, 60 N.W.2d 110, 115–16 (Iowa 1953).
24. Throughout this Article, the term “law” is deployed in three ways: law as mandate,
law as mirror, and law as method. What does extant law require with respect to our memory and
will when we die? What values are reflected in those legal assessments? And how can we better
apply those reflected principles both in law and life?
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
26. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(B) (LexisNexis 2019).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1979).
28. See, for example, GA. CODE ANN. § 36-72-8 (2019), which instructs decisionmakers to
consider, when receiving an application to disinter human remains, “[t]he adequacy of the applicant’s plans for disinterment and proper disposition of any human remains or burial objects”
and “[a]ny other compelling factors which the governing authority deems relevant.” The statute
also requires “[t]he balancing of the applicant’s interest in disinterment with the public’s and
any descendant’s interest in the value of the undisturbed cultural and natural environment.” Id.
29. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588–90 (1978).
30. See, e.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
3013. See generally Smith, supra note 13 (identifying long-standing legal protections for the dead).
31. Most writing in this area focuses on specific subsets of posthumous interests (i.e., reputation, property, or body). Don Herzog, for example, has written about the reputational interests of the dead, especially in the immediate aftermath of their death. His key examples include
someone lying about someone at a funeral and someone placing false, stigmatizing information
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have tended to narrow their inquiries to the “ ‘newly-dead’ as opposed to the
‘long-dead.’ ” 32 And even less still has been written about the ways that treatment of the dead interacts with identity-based subordination. 33 This Article
fills those gaps. Are there common principles, patterns, or trends to help us
decide what’s “outrageous” and what’s “reasonable” treatment of the dead?
How does one determine which kinds of treatment deserve approbation or
opprobrium? And how should factors like time, historic subordination, and
changing egalitarian values inform the answers to these questions?
As an illustration of the complexity of these kinds of questions, one might
reflect on the disparate ways that American culture and law treat the publication of gruesome photographs of dead bodies. The proverbial court of history
celebrates the moment in which Emmett Till’s mother allowed Jet magazine
to publish a photograph of Till’s horridly maimed corpse during the civil
rights era. 34 The graphic photo powerfully revealed the depraved, murderous,
and unimaginably brutish nature of apartheid in the United States. Moreover,
with some unease, the United States legally permits people to post photographs of their deceased close friends and family on social media. 35 On the

in an obituary. HERZOG, supra note 13 (arguing for a broader set of laws banning the defamation
of the dead). Moreover, authors have written thoughtfully about the law of trusts and estates—
an area that by its nature focuses on the interests and will of dead persons. See, e.g., LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW
(2009) (examining the history of the law of posthumous property transfer and exploring what
that history teaches about the changing nature of human relationships); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 577 (2014); Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60
U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 972 (1999) (concluding two decades ago that “the legal system ha[d] not
adequately addressed the need for decedent autonomy in confronting death and defining family”). Further, a few authors have written about questions related to interment and burial. TANYA
MARSH, THE LAW OF HUMAN REMAINS (2016); NORMAN L. CANTOR, AFTER WE DIE: THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF THE HUMAN CADAVER (2010); CHRISTINE QUIGLEY, THE CORPSE: A HISTORY
(1996); PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES (2d
ed. 1950). Andrew Gilden has written more broadly about legal models of “legacy stewardship”
and applied lessons from those models to the context of deceased persons’ digital media accounts. The Social Afterlife, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 329, 332–33 (2020).
32. SPERLING, supra note 13, at 1 (“[This] book is mainly concerned with the ‘newly dead’
as opposed to the ‘long-dead.’ ”). An exception is Ray Madoff, who argues that the dead control
the living for longer periods of time in growing and concerning ways. See MADOFF, supra note 13.
33. Wojcik, supra note 23, at 400; Smith, supra note 13, at 1518.
34. ELLIOTT J. GORN, LET THE PEOPLE SEE: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (2018); Bracey
Harris, Emmett Till Photo Incensed and Inspired a Generation, CLARION LEDGER (Aug. 30, 2018,
6:00 AM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2018/08/30/emmett-till-photo-incensedand-inspired-generation/1018644002 [perma.cc/9R5C-BRZ8]; When One Mother Defied America: The Photo That Changed the Civil Rights Movement, TIME (July 10, 2016, 12:46 PM),
https://time.com/4399793/emmett-till-civil-rights-photography [perma.cc/E2VW-8MD6].
35. Penelope Green, The iPhone at the Deathbed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/style/iphone-death-portraits.html [perma.cc/HU9X-7GZJ].
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other hand, legal mandates often prevent journalists and others from accessing and publishing gruesome photographs of the dead. 36 Indeed, courts have
criminally indicted individuals for “abuse of corpse” when soldiers and others
have taken or published photographs of the dead. 37 What accounts for the
varied cultural and legal treatment of acts that seem so similar? Part I of this
Article shows how American law engages in culturally contingent assessments
when balancing posthumous legal interests. These questions only become
more complex when applied to victims of past mass horrors.
We need frameworks for addressing these complex questions. And because law has dealt with posthumous legal interests for centuries (at least),
legal analysis can play a critical role in constructing these frameworks. Part II
of this Article demonstrates how law traditionally values the decedent’s will,
relationships, motives, and culpability. Generally, three principles are of particular salience in assessing posthumous interests. The first is the consent and
will of the deceased person. That is, the deceased person’s consent plays a paramount role in determining the legally permissible disposition of matters reasonably within her control. Second, American legal norms take seriously the
nature of the living person’s relationship with the dead person by virtue of
factors like kinship, contract, control, and community. Third, the law takes
seriously the intentions and motives of the living person who is acting toward
(or against) the dead. Remuneration, deception, and harmful intentions are
all treated suspiciously when regulating the treatment of dead persons. Part
III applies these traditional principles to debates about how to treat violently
subordinated mass victims’ dead bodies, burial sites, and images.
In Part IV, this Article focuses attention on the role of time and equality
in posthumous legal assessments, demonstrating the law’s veneration of our
preserved collective memory and its embrace of egalitarian norms in the twentieth century. With regard to time, this Article argues that in American law,
any specific individual’s memory and dignitary interests tend to diminish over
time. By contrast, the law tends to concern itself with the preservation of collective memory and dignity long after death. This is illustrated by laws governing historical preservation, which give more protection to cemeteries and
structures over time rather than less.
This Article also shows that egalitarianism and related norms of antisubordination also came to shape the law of the dead in underappreciated ways
over the course of the twentieth century. By fostering stigma, fueling terror,

36. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160, 166–69 (2004); Megan
Bittakis, Tragic Representations: The Curious Contradiction Between Cases Seeking Access to Autopsy and Death Scene Photographs and Cases Regarding the Consequences of Such Photographs
Being Published, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 161 (2013); Clay Calvert, The Privacy of Death: An Emergent
Jurisprudence and Legal Rebuke to Media Exploitation and a Voyeuristic Culture, 26 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 133 (2006).
37. See Bill Chappell, Navy SEAL Demoted for Taking Photo with Corpse of ISIS Fighter,
NPR (July 3, 2019, 4:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/03/738463353/jury-reduces-navyseals-rank-for-taking-photo-with-corpse-of-isis-fighter [perma.cc/7M68-PXGB]; see also State
v. Condon, 789 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
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and legally estranging individuals from the government, unequal and brutal
treatment of the dead can serve as an important site of subordination. 38
Taken together, these descriptive observations have normative significance. If collective memory is valuable across generations, and if abusing the
memory of the dead can serve to perpetuate subordination, then we must be
careful about how we remember and treat the abused and the debased dead.
One generation’s treatment of the dead can unwittingly advance a previous
generation’s subordination. On this theory, when a group is subordinated
through acts of mass horror, later generations can become complicit in that
horror by exploiting and dishonoring the subjugated peoples’ memory. In
building this theory, this Article relies on arguments advanced by George
Pitcher, Joel Feinberg, Martha Nussbaum, and Don Herzog. On this account,
an individual can experience posthumous harm when someone alters the
shape of the decedent’s unique life. In this Article, I invite readers to consider
the special implications this theory has when members of a targeted group’s
memories are subordinated in a systemic and sustained way.
Part IV also outlines a theory of how generations can become complicit
in previous generations’ horrors and how this complicity is compounded by
corrupted collective memory and lineal alienation. The risk of intergenerational complicity is particularly high in the United States in light of two aspects of this nation’s history. First, powerful actors in previous generations
intentionally disrupted America’s collective memory about this nation’s mass
human rights abuses. 39 Monuments honoring colonizers and Confederates
outnumber memorials to the colonized, the captured, and the controlled by
orders of magnitude. Past subordination shapes our present memory. Second,
America has a significant history of what I will call “lineal alienation.” By lineal
alienation, I mean ways that violent, identity-based subordination has disrupted some individuals’ relationships with their descendants. 40 Because of

38. Smith, supra note 13, at 1518–19.
39. See CHARLES REAGAN WILSON, BAPTIZED IN BLOOD: THE RELIGION OF THE LOST
CAUSE, 1865–1920 (1980); GAINES M. FOSTER, GHOSTS OF THE CONFEDERACY: DEFEAT, THE
LOST CAUSE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1865 TO 1913, at 4 (1987).
40. This concept is deeply related to, and distinct from, Orlando Patterson’s profoundly
influential conception of “natal alienation.” ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH
5 (1982). Natal alienation has been defined as “the deprivation of rights or claims of birth, of
claims on and obligations to parents, and of connection to living blood relations, ancestors, or
descendants.” Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1362 (1994). Building on Patterson’s work, some scholars have also persuasively argued that natal alienation describes America’s treatment of indigenous persons as well.
See James P. Sterba, Understanding Evil: American Slavery, the Holocaust, and the Conquest of
the American Indians, 106 ETHICS 424, 437–38 (1996) (reviewing LAURENCE MORDEKHAI
THOMAS, VESSELS OF EVIL: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE HOLOCAUST (1993)); Rebecca Tsosie,
Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1615, 1662 (2000). By invoking the concept of lineal alienation, I wish to bring attention to the
multidirectional effects that accompany the uprooting of persons from their ancestral origins.
The ancestor loses access to descendants who can care for her memory, dignity, and legacy.
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lineal alienation, slaves have fewer living trustees to care for their memories
and legacies.
After outlining these descriptive and theoretical claims about time and
equality, layered with American history, this Article turns to a related question. To the extent that this theory of time and equality reflects worthy aspirational norms, are there ways that the law can be oriented to better reflect
those norms? Part V offers four prescriptions for how legal doctrine and policy can better avoid this kind of intergenerational complicity. First, America’s
history of lineal alienation has implications for who should be considered a
legally cognizable trustee of the interests of the exploited, subjugated dead.
When slave cemeteries are discovered, for example, placing exclusive weight
on biological kinship when determining whether someone has a legal claim is
troubling, even cruel, in a country that forcedly and routinely separated slaves
from their kin. The second reform concerns protection for abandoned cemeteries. I argue that when such cemeteries are disturbed inadvertently, they
should not be further disturbed without procedural and substantive protections akin to those that known abandoned cemeteries receive. Third, if courts
and lawmakers take the proffered relationship between time, equality, and
death seriously, this has implications for what type of conduct is deemed “unreasonable,” “offensive,” and “outrageous,” all of which are important legal
terms in the law governing dead bodies and images. Any equitable accounting
of these kinds of contextually inflected terms must acknowledge America’s
history of violent subordination, legal erasure, and lineal alienation. Fourth, I
argue for significant governmental investment in monuments, museums, arts,
and other resources designed to counter false, corrupted memories about
America’s past.
I.

THE CULTURAL CONTINGENCY OF POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS

[C]ourts will not close their eyes to the customs and necessities of civilization in dealing with the dead and those sentiments connected with decently disposing of the remains of the departed which furnish one ground of difference between men and brutes.
Justice Joseph Lumpkin III 41

“Respectful.” “Offensive.” “Ethical.” “Outrageous.” Dueling words like
these serve as lodestars and admonitions when the bodies and images of victims of past horrors are unearthed and exposed. When, for example, research
revealed that fifty-three skulls on display at a museum at the University of
Pennsylvania were those of former slaves from Cuba, the university stated that
it was “committed to working through this important process with heritage
community stakeholders in an ethical and respectful manner.” 42 And when
41. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905).
42. Johnny Diaz, Penn Museum to Relocate Skull Collection of Enslaved People, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/27/us/Penn-museum-slavery-skullsMorton-cranial.html [perma.cc/R8AH-AQRY]. See generally ANN FABIAN, THE SKULL
COLLECTORS: RACE, SCIENCE, AND AMERICA’S UNBURIED DEAD (2010) (profiling nineteenth-
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the University of Georgia (UGA) discovered a badly neglected slave cemetery
on its campus, it promised that its treatment of the bodies would be “respectful” and “dignified.” 43
Those institutions and others, however, have faced vocal concerns and
vehement criticism. Activists at Penn asked the university to repair the damage done by the “unethical acquisition” and exploitation of the crania and,
more broadly, called on the university to “remove all images from the Museum’s digital footprint that represent the deceased without consent.” 44 At
UGA, a faculty committee concluded that it was factually “not possible” to
accept the university’s official narrative that the remains were treated in an
“exemplary and respectful way.” 45 The report cited, among others, my own
father, a Georgia native and a key critic of UGA’s disinterment of the human
remains. In a manner that moved me as a descendant of former slaves, a son,
and a scholar, he implored the local community at a public forum: “If you
can’t get outraged about someone destroying your great-grandparents’ graves,
what can you get outraged about?” 46
Law has a potentially important role in contextualizing and informing
these recurring cultural disputes, because law has long been a mode through
which Americans have confronted questions about the proper treatment of the
dead. For example, there are at least four long-standing “rights” after death in
America’s legal tradition: bodily integrity (protection against mutilation and
other bodily violations), dignified interment, protection against undignified
disturbance once interred, and control over the disposition of one’s property. 47
This Part outlines how courts and policymakers are necessarily called on
to assign weight to these posthumous legal interests. That is, they assess which
factors add gravity to the decedents’ interests, and which factors diminish
century researcher Samuel George Morton, whose extensive collection of human skulls contributed to the pseudoscience of racial superiority); Lisa A. Giunta, Note, The Dead on Display: A
Call for the International Regulation of Plastination Exhibits, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 164
(2010) (criticizing recent museum exhibits for “putting the bodies of the deceased on display for
profit” without sufficient consent or respect).
43. UNIV. OF GA., REPORT FROM THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON BALDWIN HALL TO THE
FRANKLIN COLLEGE FACULTY SENATE 37 (2019), https://www.franklin.uga.edu/sites/default/files/Faculty%20Senate%20ad%20hoc%20committee%20report%204-17-19.pdf
[perma.cc/B523-6H4W] [hereinafter UGA BALDWIN HALL REPORT].
44. #PoliceFreePenn: An Abolitionist Assembly (@policefreepenn), Repatriation & Reparations NOW! Restating What We Mean by Abolish the Morton Collection., MEDIUM (Apr. 14,
2021),
https://medium.com/@policefreepenn/repatriation-reparations-now-restating-whatwe-mean-by-abolish-the-morton-collection-9a67f9206279 [perma.cc/AL7H-KKVS] [hereinafter Abolish the Morton Collection].
45. UGA BALDWIN HALL REPORT, supra note 43.
46. Rebecca McCarthy, Panel Wrestles With UGA’s Legacy of Slavery, FLAGPOLE (Mar.
27, 2017), https://flagpole.com/news/city-dope/2017/03/27/panel-wrestles-with-ugas-legacyof-slavery [perma.cc/L3UE-ZAKH].
47. Smith, supra note 13, at 1475. Law also protects posthumous interests in privacy and
equality. See Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2017); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020) (defining
“protected health information” to include identifiable health information regarding patients
who have been deceased for fewer than fifty years); see also Smith, supra note 13, at 1518–27.
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those interests. This is true in two ways. First, legal mandates in this area often
rely on elements that are culturally contingent or dependent on community
sensibilities. These include terms like “outrageous,” “offensive,” “reasonable,”
“and “respect.” Second, even when legislatures issue more precise legal rules
that protect interests after death, these decisionmakers must choose which aspects of humanity to honor after death, how to honor them, and how to balance those interests against the needs and desires of the living. 48
A. Culturally Contingent Terms
In his book The Work of the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains,
cultural historian Thomas Laqueur writes, “[T]he dead have two lives: one in
nature, the other in culture.” 49 Laqueur’s work canvasses the many ways that
humans have shown reverence to human bodies across time and place. 50
Among the norms that vary are the suitability of certain sites of burial, the
acceptability of cremation, and the relative importance of individually marked
tombstones. He observes, to be sure, that cultures appear to have universal
respect for human remains. 51 But what constitutes respectful conduct is far
from fixed. Consistent with these observations, to the extent that legal mandates concerning the dead turns on what “outrages” or “offends,” these mandates are imbued with cultural values and norms. Because terms like this
pervade the law of the dead, this body of law offers a rich site of study.
Included in this discussion are torts and crimes that focus on familial outrage or distress. One might question whether those elements belong in a discussion about posthumous legal interests. To the extent that a law turns on
the distress of living family members, how could such a law furnish a meaningful example of a court weighing interests after death? I include claims based
on familial outrage and anguish for two reasons. First, the history of familial
claims such as “abuse of corpse” are historically bound up in the idea that
families are surviving trustees for the interests of the dead. In the 1820 English
case Gilbert v. Buzzard, Lord Stowell (Sir William Scott) noted the long-standing right of the dead “to be returned to [their] parent earth for dissolution[]

48. As a doctrinal matter, extracting these principles can help bring clarity to the law and
offer administrable standards for courts to apply. As a cultural matter, by appreciating what law
has tended to deem “reasonable” or “outrageous” with respect to deceased persons, there may
be lessons about the dimensions of our shared humanity that are valued after death. In turn,
those lessons can help institutions and individuals answer hard cultural questions when the law
seems insufficient or uncertain.
49. THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, THE WORK OF THE DEAD: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MORTAL
REMAINS 10 (2015); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Death and the War Power, 30 YALE J.L. &
HUMANS. 25, 38 (2018).
50. LAQUEUR, supra note 49; see also CANTOR, supra note 31; QUIGLEY, supra note 31.
51. See LAQUEUR, supra note 49, at 40; see also Smith, supra note 13, at 1507 (“Because
cultures almost universally assign human meaning to the dead and adopt conventions to protect
the dead, violations of these conventions dishonor that meaning. And violating that meaning is
thereby a form of dishonoring shared human dignity.” (footnote omitted)).
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and to be carried there for that purpose in a decent and inoffensive manner.” 52
Relying on that right, American courts recognized a living person’s “quasi
property” interest in the dead bodies of family members to facilitate this right
of burial. 53 This “quasi property” interest in the body arises from “duties to
perform towards it arising out of our common humanity,” as a leading nineteenth-century case put it. 54 Second, and perhaps more importantly, legal protection of a surviving family from outrage, anguish, and offense is itself a
useful site of study. These protections invite reflection on the cultural norms
that shape who (including which family members) can serve as trustees for
dead persons, whose outrage is legally cognizable, and what mental anguish is
deemed foreseeable or compensable.
1.

“Outrage”

“Outrage” is often an element of criminal and civil claims against those
who commit abuses against the dead. Laws that prohibit the abuse of corpses
and desecration of grave sites tend to focus on conduct that would likely outrage the community or family. Tennessee courts, for example, have held that
“[t]he gravamen of the offense” of indecently disposing of a dead body “is that
the facts supporting the crime be such that ‘the feelings and natural sentiments
of the public would be outraged.’ ” 55 A Tennessee statute similarly defines desecration of a burial site as “defacing, damaging, polluting or otherwise physically mistreating in a way that the person knows or should know will outrage
the sensibilities of an ordinary individual likely to observe or discover the person’s action.” 56
This reliance on outrage is neither new nor unique. In the 1939 case State
v. Bradbury, Maine’s high court upheld the conviction of a man for indecently
burning his sister’s dead body “in such a manner that, when the facts should
in the natural course of events become known, the feelings and natural sentiments of the public would be outraged.” 57 Similarly, Ohio law bans abuses of
dead bodies that reasonably outrage families or community sensibilities. 58
Laws in Colorado, Delaware, Hawaiʻi, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia also
ban conduct against dead persons or burial sites that outrage “community

52. (1820) 161 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1348; 3 Phill. Ecc. 333, 352–53.
53. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 238–39 (1872).
54. Id. at 242–43.
55. Wilks v. State, No. E2002-00846-CCA-R3-PC, 2002 WL 31780720, at *2 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Dec. 13, 2002) (quoting John S. Herbrand, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Making It a Criminal Offense to Mistreat or Wrongfully Dispose of Dead Body,
81 A.L.R.3D 1071, 1073 (1977)).
56. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-301 (Supp. 2020); see also id. § 39-17-311(a)(1) (2018).
57. 9 A.2d 657, 659 (Me. 1939). This language was later codified. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17–A, § 507 (2006).
58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(B) (LexisNexis 2019).
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sensibilities.” 59 Moreover, the Model Penal Code recommends that states
criminalize actions that “treat[] a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage
ordinary family sensibilities.” 60
In the civil context, treatment of the dead often intersects with the tort of
“intentional infliction of emotional distress”—a claim that also requires “outrage.” For plaintiffs to prove “intentional infliction of emotional distress, or
outrageous conduct,” there are three key elements: “(1) the conduct complained
of must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be so outrageous that
it is not tolerated by civilized society; and (3) the conduct complained of must
result in serious mental injury.” 61 “Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous.’ ” 62
Facts that have sustained this type of tort action include a case where a
person disinterred a body, doused the body with “caustic chemical,” and then
left parts of the body in the forest. 63 Likewise, trespassing onto a cemetery and
damaging a tombstone has sustained an outrage claim. 64 A court has also sustained an outrage claim where an undertaker refused to return to a widow her
deceased husband’s body in order to coax her into buying a more expensive
casket. 65 And more recently, a federal court sustained an outrage claim in a
high-profile case involving Natalee Holloway, an eighteen-year old Alabama
resident who disappeared while vacationing in Aruba. A media outlet allegedly misled Holloway’s mother about whether bones and other biological material were her daughter’s, knowing the bones likely belonged to an animal.
“Such conduct is plausibly extreme and outrageous and so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it under Alabama law.” 66
The concept of outrage has also been invoked in equitable cases concerning whether to disinter bodies. One notable example is Judge Benjamin
Cardozo’s 1926 opinion in Yome v. Gorman. 67 In that case, a widow requested
that the owners of a religious cemetery disinter her deceased husband so that
she could bury him in a plot next to one she had purchased for her own burial.

59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-113 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 711-1107 to -1108
(LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2020); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5509 (West 2015); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-14 (LexisNexis 2020). Delaware law bans desecration of “object[s] of veneration,” DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1331 (2021), which has been used to support prosecutions for the
desecration of grave sites. See State v. Melvin, No. C.R. 1507023761, 2016 WL 616979, at *1 (Del.
Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 5, 2016).
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
61. Akers v. Prime Succession of Tenn., Inc., No. E2009-02203-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL
4908396, at *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2011) (quoting Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622
(Tenn. 1997)), aff’d, 387 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. 2012).
62. Id.
63. Gray Brown-Serv. Mortuary, Inc. v. Lloyd, 729 So. 2d 280, 285–86 (Ala. 1999).
64. Whitt v. Hulsey, 519 So. 2d 901, 903–06 (Ala. 1987).
65. Levite Undertakers Co. v. Griggs, 495 So. 2d 63, 64 (Ala. 1986).
66. Holloway v. Oxygen Media, LLC, 361 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2019).
67. 152 N.E. 126, 127 (N.Y. 1926).
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Other close kin supported her request. But, writing for the New York Court
of Appeals, Judge Cardozo explained that only in some “rare emergency”
would it be acceptable for a court “to take a body from its grave in consecrated
ground and put it in ground unhallowed if there was good reason to suppose
that the conscience of the deceased, were he alive, would be outraged by the
change.” 68 The opinion instructed the trial court to privilege evidence of the
decedent’s wishes on remand. For decades thereafter, Judge Cardozo’s opinion served as “the leading case on this subject”; relying on Yome, other courts
sought to avoid moves that would “outrage” decedents if they were alive. 69
2.

“Offensive”

When laws regulate dead bodies and matters of interment, another element or term is “offensiveness.” The term is much less common than “outrage” but is nonetheless a long-standing feature of this body of law. An early
invocation of this element can be found in the 1912 case Seaton v. Commonwealth. 70 In that case, an impoverished father buried his prematurely born son
in a self-created wooden coffin in his backyard rather than a cemetery. 71 While
he was convicted for indecently burying his son, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (then Kentucky’s highest court) reversed, finding that the interment was
not sufficiently offensive as a matter of custom. It reasoned,
The custom of the country imposed upon [the] appellant only the duty of decently burying his child; that is, it must be properly clothed when being taken
to the place of burial, and then placed in the ground or tomb, so that it will
not become offensive or injurious to the lives of others. He may not cast it
into the street, or into a running stream, or into a hole in the ground, or make
any disposition of it that might be regarded as creating a nuisance, be offensive to the sense of decency, or be injurious to the health of the community. 72

The defendant’s actions comported with this duty even if, the court gratuitously added, he was “a man utterly lacking in parental instincts.” 73
Today, some statutes formally incorporate offensiveness as an element of
crimes concerning the abuse of dead bodies. In Arkansas, for example, it is
illegal to “[p]hysically mistreat[] or conceal[] a corpse in a manner offensive
to a person of reasonable sensibilities.” 74 The phrase “in a manner offensive to

68. Yome, 152 N.E. at 128.
69. Goldman v. Mollen, 191 S.E. 627, 633 (Va. 1937); Friedman v. Gomel Chesed Hebrew
Cemetery Ass’n, 92 A.2d 117, 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952).
70. 149 S.W. 871 (Ky. 1912). Tanya Marsh relies on this case as evidence that much of the
law in this area is a matter of custom and common law. MARSH, supra note 31, at 4 n.4. The case
is also discussed in Ellen Stroud, Law and the Dead Body: Is a Corpse a Person or a Thing?, 14
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 115, 121 (2018).
71. Seaton, 149 S.W. at 871.
72. Id. at 873.
73. Id.
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-101(a)(2) (2016).
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a person of reasonable sensibilities” means, among other things, “in a manner
that is outside the normal practices of handling or disposing of a corpse.” 75 Likewise, in Tennessee, it is a felony to “[p]hysically mistreat[] a corpse in a manner offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person.” 76 In Texas, it is a crime
if one “disinters, disturbs, damages, dissects, in whole or in part, carries away,
or treats in an offensive manner a human corpse.” 77 Moreover, it is a crime in
Texas to vandalize, damage, or treat “in an offensive manner the space in which
a human corpse has been interred or otherwise permanently laid to rest.” 78
3.

Reasonableness

For over a century, the tort of negligence has been invoked when persons
or institutions unreasonably mutilate a dead body or otherwise interfere with
a burial. One leading case on the subject is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.
v. Wilson. 79 In 1903, a woman bought a train ticket to transport her husband’s
body from Atlanta to a small town in eastern Georgia, where he was to be
buried. When the train carrying the body reached a junction point, the railroad company placed the body on an open platform, where it lay in the rain
unprotected for several hours. The body became “soaked and otherwise mutilated.” 80 Georgia courts found that this conduct was grossly negligent and
allowed the widow to sue for damage to the $75 coffin and shroud, as well as
humiliation and mental anguish. 81
Wilson represents a broader class of cases against those who negligently
perform their duty to care for dead bodies or otherwise negligently interfere
with interment. And while the plaintiff in Wilson alleged “gross negligence,”
some jurisdictions have allowed recovery for ordinary negligence in this context. 82 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body
of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to
liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.” 83
Culturally contingent assessments about how the dead are to be treated
inflect our understanding of the gravity of the plaintiff’s loss, overriding the
physical-injury requirement for negligence claims. In most negligence cases,
it is highly unusual to allow recovery for mental anguish caused by ordinary

75. Id.
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–17–312 (2018).
77. 12 TEX. JUR. 3D CEMETERIES § 61, at 68–69 (2019).
78. Id.
79. 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905).
80. Wilson, 51 S.E. at 24.
81. Id. at 24–25.
82. See, e.g., Del Core v. Mohican Historic Hous. Assocs., 837 A.2d 902, 905 (Conn. App. Ct.
2004); Crawford v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc., 253 S.W.3d 149, 159–60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
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negligence absent a showing of physical injury. As explained in the 1984 edition of Prosser and Keeton’s treatise, “Where the defendant’s negligence
causes only mental disturbance, without accompanying physical injury, illness
or other physical consequences, and in the absence of some other independent
basis for tort liability, the great majority of courts still hold that in the ordinary
case there can be no recovery.” 84 Yet treatment of dead bodies represents an
exception to that general rule. Courts often allow recovery “for negligent embalming, negligent shipment, running over the body, and the like, without
such circumstances of aggravation.” 85 As one federal court recently put it,
[A]lthough courts have traditionally been reluctant to allow negligence actions where only emotional damages are claimed, the more modern view
supports the position taken by plaintiff in the instant case and recognizes an
ordinary negligence cause of action arising out of the next of kin’s right to
possession of a decedent’s remains. 86

4.

Respect

The degree of legal protection that cemeteries receive sometimes depends
expressly on the public’s recognition and respect. This legal standard is most
evident in cases involving disinterment or destruction of gravesites. That is,
among the many ways that a cemetery can lose legal protection is that members of the public no longer treat it as a cemetery. In the early 1920s, for example, in South Carolina, a plaintiff sued developers that disturbed a site
containing his family’s human bodies. The developers alleged that the cemetery had been abandoned and therefore merited significantly less legal protection than an active cemetery. When the issue reached the South Carolina
Supreme Court, that tribunal articulated its goal of approximating public sentiment on this delicate subject. It explained that
laws do, or should, set forth the sentiment of the people who are subject to
them. This is particularly true under a government like ours. From the time
of Abraham, the places where the dead were buried have been considered
sacred and inviolate. All nations respect the graves of the dead. 87

84. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 361
(5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 362 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Keaton v. G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc.,
436 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013); Brown v. Bayview Crematory, LLC, 945 N.E.2d 990,
994 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); Vasquez v. State, 206 P.3d 753, 765 n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Blackwell v. Dykes Funeral Homes, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 692, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Guth v. Freeland,
28 P.3d 982, 988 (Haw. 2001); Kelly v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 745 N.E.2d 969, 978 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2001); Contreraz v. Michelotti–Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120–21 (Mont. 1995); Brown
v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 801 P.2d 37, 44 (Idaho 1990); Moresi v. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095–96 (La. 1990).
86. Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, 59 N.E.3d 234, 246–49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
87. Frost v. Columbia Clay Co., 124 S.E. 767, 768 (S.C. 1924).
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In determining whether the defendants had illegally disturbed graves, the
court accordingly cited a legal treatise for the proposition that “where a cemetery has been so neglected as entirely to lose its identity as such, and is no
longer known, recognized, and respected by the public as a cemetery, it may
be said to be abandoned.” 88 This standard for abandonment has been cited in
number of states across the country, including Alabama, Kansas, New York,
and Pennsylvania. 89
B. Culturally Contingent Balancing
Some legal regulations expressly call on decisionmakers or judges to balance the need for respectful treatment of the dead against other important
public interests. This kind of balancing is particularly pronounced in cases involving disinterment. Under a Georgia statute, for example, when an entity
applies for a permit to disturb an abandoned cemetery, local authorities are to
balance “the applicant’s interest in disinterment with the public’s and any descendant’s interest in the value of the undisturbed cultural and natural environment.” 90 Among other factors, local authorities are also required to
consider “[t]he adequacy of the applicant’s plans for disinterment and proper
disposition of any human remains or burial objects” as well as “[a]ny other
compelling factors which the governing authority deems relevant.” 91 And until recently, Iowa law required that upon determining whether to permit disinterment, “[d]ue consideration . . . shall be given to the public health, the
dead, and the feelings of relatives.” 92
More frequently, these kinds of balancing standards have been incorporated by way of the common law. These balancing tests reflect cultural choices
about how to honor and prioritize competing desires and needs. Under Illinois law, for example,

88. Id. at 770 (citations omitted).
89. Boyd v. Brabham, 414 So. 2d 931, 935 (Ala. 1982); State ex rel. Stephan v. Lane, 614
P.2d 987, 997–98 (Kan. 1980); Ferncliff Cemetery Ass’n v. Town of Greenburgh, 124 N.Y.S.3d
61, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020); In re First Evangelical Lutheran Church, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 93, 99
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Westmoreland Cnty. 1957).
90. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-72-8 (2019).
91. Id.
92. IOWA CODE § 144.34 (2020) (amended 2020). The revised statute de-emphasizes the
will of the decedent. See IOWA CODE § 144.34 (2021) (“Due consideration . . . shall be given to
the public health, the preferences of a person authorized to control final disposition of a decedent’s remains . . . , and any court order.”); cf. Gilden, supra note 31 (encouraging decentering
the decedent when stewarding a person’s legacy after death and instead focusing more on the
decedent’s social context).
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[i]t is the policy of the law, except in cases of necessity or for laudable purposes, that the sanctity of the grave should be maintained, and that a body
once suitably buried should remain undisturbed, and a court will not ordinarily order or permit a body to be disinterred unless there is a strong showing that it is necessary and that the interests of justice require. 93

Over the past century, various balancing tests for proper disinterment have been
adopted in California, 94 Colorado, 95 Minnesota, 96 Mississippi, 97 New Mexico, 98
and Pennsylvania. 99 Among the most common factors in these tests include the
wishes of the decedent and the relationship between the decedent and the person seeking to disinter the body. Also common are appeals to the public interest: California law instructs courts to consider “the interests of the public”; 100
in Colorado, the “[i]mpact of disinterments on others”; 101 and in New Mexico,
the “public interest.” 102 In Minnesota, courts are asked to weigh “[t]he strength
of the reasons offered both in favor of and in opposition to reinterment.” 103
II.

TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS

Our legal system allows the dead to control the living, at least up to a point.
Lawrence Friedman 104

There are common principles that structure how courts weigh and enforce posthumous legal interests. First, the clear, good-faith wishes of the decedent are generally honored when practicable. Second, the law takes seriously
the relationship between the decedent and the living person or institution attempting to act toward, or on behalf of, the dead. Law confers agency and obligations based on conceptions of kinship, contract, control, and community.
Third, motive and fault are important. American law encourages suspicion
when a living person is profiting off a dead person without consent; acts with
deception; is knowingly, recklessly, or unreasonably causing harm; or killed
the decedent.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Fischer’s Est. v. Fischer, 117 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954).
Maffei v. Woodlawn Mem’l Park, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 685–87 (Ct. App. 2005).
Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Colo. App. 1991).
Spadaro v. Catholic Cemeteries, 330 N.W.2d 116, 118–19 (Minn. 1983).
Hood v. Spratt, 357 So. 2d 135, 137 (Miss. 1978).
Theodore v. Theodore, 259 P.2d 795, 797 (N.M. 1953).
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904).
Maffei v. Woodlawn Mem’l Park, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 685–86 (Ct. App. 2005).
Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Colo. App. 1991).
Theodore, 259 P.2d at 795.
Spadaro v. Catholic Cemeteries, 330 N.W.2d 116, 118–19 (Minn. 1983).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 125.
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A. Intention
American law is deeply attentive to fulfilling the expressed will of the decedent on matters reasonably within the decedent’s control. 105 Through wills
and trusts, for example, people have considerable power of “testimonial disposition,” directing to whom one’s property will go, how it should get there,
and—to some extent—how that property can be used. This right of testimonial disposition has been described as “one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights.” 106 The default rule, with some important exceptions, is that
most property is posthumously transferable. 107 As the Supreme Court expressed in Hodel v. Irving, “In one form or another, the right to pass on property—to one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American
legal system since feudal times.” 108 And as one 1856 South Carolina court put
it, “Few rights are regarded with so much jealousy as the right of testamentary
disposition of one’s own property . . . .” 109
The American legal system also gives significant weight to decedents’ directives about their interment. In the words of a New York court in 1880,
“[T]he dead themselves now have rights, which are committed to the living to
protect,” including “the undisturbed rest of their own remains.” 110 This is not to
say these desires or testaments are always followed; sometimes other interests
take precedent. 111 But it is nonetheless an indispensably important interest
that American law regularly takes into account when enforcing death rights. “A
person has the right to control the disposition of his or her own remains without the predeath or postdeath consent of another person,” avers a Washington
statute. 112 Statutes in Oklahoma and South Dakota have similar language. 113 Indeed, laws respecting decedents’ express wishes as to interment are quite common. 114
105. Professor Gilden calls this the “freedom of disposition model.” See Gilden, supra note
31, at 333.
106. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
107. Horton, supra note 31, at 577.
108. 481 U.S. at 716.
109. Burton v. Yeldell, 30 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich. Eq.) 9, 15 (1856).
110. Thompson v. Hickey, 8 Abb. N. Cas. 159, 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880).
111. See, e.g., Shipley Estate, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 331 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1970). In that case, a deceased man’s will stated his desire to be buried in Tennessee near his extramarital paramour. But
his wife, who was in Pennsylvania, wished for him to be buried in that state instead. A court
ruled in favor of the wife, citing the decedent’s deceit. “[B]ecause of the deceitful double life in
which decedent encased himself, it is apparent to this court that he forfeited any right that he
may have had to have his desires as to his burial honored, since such desires conflict with those
of his lawful widow.” Id. at 338. See also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE
L.J. 781, 784 (2005) (“[M]any American courts have rejected the notion that an owner has the
right to destroy that which is hers, particularly in the testamentary context.”).
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.160 (2020).
113. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1151 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-26-1 (2011).
114. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102 (2018); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100.1
(West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-19-104 (2020); D.C. CODE § 3-413 (2021); DEL. CODE tit.
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B. Relationship
When assessing the weight of posthumous legal interests, another core
variable is the relationship between the living person(s) and the decedent.
That is, what was the relationship between the person who died, and the person seeking to act toward, or on behalf of, the dead person? The nature of this
relationship influences two types of legal consequences. First, it can determine
the scope of the living person’s legal agency to act toward, or on behalf of, the
decedent. 115 Second, some relationships can create certain legal obligations to
act toward, or on behalf of, the decedent. The most important categories of
these relationships are kinship, contract, control, and shared community.
1.

Kinship

Familial ties are an important feature of posthumous legal interests. After
death, kinship helps shape the disposition of one’s property, body, and privacy
interests. For estates, the familial role is most acute when a person dies intestate. That is, laws specify how assets are to be distributed either when someone
dies without a will or when some portion of the decedent’s estate is not covered by a will. Spouses tend to be highest in the distributional chain in this
scenario, followed by children. 116 In the absence of either, intestate distribution often includes other kin, such as parents, siblings, and grandchildren. 117
Even when a person does have a will, kinship still matters in some circumstances. All but one state protects spouses even when they are not included
expressly in a will. The most common method is through what is called an
“elective share,” in which some percentage of the property is distributed to a
spouse before the remainder of the will is honored. 118 Over the past century,
the law in this area reflects an increased protection for spouses, in relation to
a previously privileged role for offspring. Lawrence Friedman has called this
“the shift from emphasis on the bloodline family to the family of affection and

12, § 264 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 54-1139 (2017); IND. CODE § 29-2-19-9 (2020); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 5-509 (LexisNexis Supp. 2020); MINN. STAT. § 149A.80 (2020); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 38-1426 (2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1151 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.130 (2019); 20
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305(a) (West Supp. 2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-26-1
(2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(g) (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 9702(a)(16) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.160 (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-17-101 (2021).
115. Cf. Gilden, supra note 31, at 340 (“Emotional and cultural legacies accordingly do not
require planning; they require stewardship.”).
116. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 2020)
(describing spouse’s share); id. § 2-103, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 30 (describing other heirs); TEX. EST. CODE
ANN. § 201.001 (West 2020). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(c)(1) (2021) (providing that the
spouse’s share be the same as the children’s share, but not less than one-third).
117. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103 (amended 2019), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 30–32.
118. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Individuated Determination of a Surviving Spouse’s Elective
Share, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2473 (2020).
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dependence.” 119 He attributed this shift to changes in American family structures. Other scholars have attributed this shift to the increased political, economic, and cultural role of women in the United States. 120
Kinship also plays a paramount role in terms of one protecting one’s
body. This is most apparent when it comes to a decedent’s interment. At the
common law, unless a decedent’s wish was “strongly and recently expressed,”
the wish of a surviving spouse was paramount. 121 And if unmarried, “the right
[to dispose of remains] is in the next of kin in the order of their relation to the
decedent, as children of proper age, parents, brothers and sisters, or more distant kin, modified, it may be, by circumstances of special intimacy or association with the decedent.” 122 State laws across the country continue to hold that
when the decedent has not specified their preferred method of interment in
writing, it is close kin who decide. 123 Here, too, spouses tend to be considered
the closest kin in this scenario, followed by other kin such as children, parents,
and siblings. Families are also centered with regard to disinterment. 124
This control over interment includes the right to sue when someone interferes. 125 Moreover, family members are sometimes centered in criminal laws
banning the abuse of a corpse, given that the Model Penal Code recommends
the prohibition of conduct that “would outrage ordinary family sensibilities.” 126
Familial relationships also create obligations toward dead bodies. Under
Alaska law, “Every needy person . . . shall be given a decent burial by the
spouse, children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, or siblings of the
needy person, if they, or any of them, have the ability to do so, in the order
named.” 127 Even more directly, there are criminal laws against “abandonment”
or “concealment” of dead bodies in ways that make it impossible for them to
be interred properly. 128 And as the 2002 Missouri case of State v. Bratina exemplifies, families tend to have particular duties not to abandon their kin. 129
In Bratina, a man was charged with abandonment for failing to report the

119. FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 19 (emphases omitted).
120. RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY? PROPERTY AND THE DEAD HAND 75
(2007); Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149,
1152 (2011) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW (2009)).
121. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904); MARSH, supra note 31, at 9.
122. Pettigrew, 56 A. at 880.
123. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102(d)(1) (2018); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7100 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-19-106 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 194.119 (2016);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 290:16 (2016); VA. STAT. ANN. § 54.1-2807.01 (2019).
124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1365.02 (2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 711.004 (West Supp. 2020).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
127. ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.230 (2020).
128. TORCIA, supra note 18, § 524 (“At common law, it is a nuisance to fail to provide a
decent burial for a person to whom the defendant owes such a duty.”).
129. 73 S.W. 3d 625 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
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death of his dead wife, and leaving her in their home. He argued that the state’s
abandonment statute was unconstitutionally vague. The challenged law stated
that “[a] person commits the crime of abandonment of a corpse if that person
abandons, disposes, deserts or leaves a corpse without properly reporting the
location of the body to the proper law enforcement officials in that county.” 130
The court concluded that the law was sufficiently clear that close kin have a
duty to report deaths promptly. 131 “The concept of ‘abandonment’ in the statute,” the court explained, “clearly is based upon a person having an interest
in, or duty with respect to, the body.” 132 “Bratina is not a mere bystander. The
body is that of his wife, the body was in his household, and he is the next of
kin,” the court reasoned. 133
Furthermore, families are authorized to protect the privacy interests of
the dead. On questions of medical privacy, families have the power to object
to the release of information about their kin under federal regulations and under state law. 134 In addition, some states have recognized various notions of
privacy that prevent the unauthorized distribution of photographic images of
a corpse. In Reid v. Pierce County, the Washington Supreme Court permitted
families to sue a county for invasion of privacy for publicly displaying photographs of their kin’s corpses without authorization. 135 And in State v. Condon,
the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of a photographer who,
without permission, took photographs of dead bodies in a morgue with the
intention of making them public. 136 The outcome in Condon might have been
different, however, if the photographer had obtained permission from the
family (or from the predeath consent of the dead subjects). The Court of Appeals explained,
Had Condon been able, therefore, to devise a means of obtaining either legal
authorization or the consent causa mortis of his subjects (or perhaps even
the posthumous consent of their families), he would have been free to express himself by taking the pictures that he did. Condon, however, did not
receive authorization, nor did he receive the consent of the families of those
whose bodies he chose to photograph. 137

2.

Control

When the government exerts custodial control over a person in life, this
sometimes creates legal obligations that persist in death. The clearest example

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Bratina, 73 S.W.3d at 626.
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 627.
Id.
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020); Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1127–32 (Fla. 2017).
961 P.2d 333, 335 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
State v. Condon, 789 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 703.
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is the state’s duties to deceased prisoners. 138 These include informing family
members of the death and providing a decent interment if the family is unable
to do so. Under California law, for example, when a person dies in confinement and the family does not take possession of the body, the state “shall dispose of the body by cremation or burial.” 139 Arizona law is also illustrative.
When a family is unwilling to provide for “the burial or other funeral and disposition arrangements, or cannot be located on reasonable inquiry,” the duty
falls on the state. 140 This approach is common across the United States. 141
Moreover, federal law provides for the “care and disposition of the remains of
prisoners of war and interned enemy aliens who die while in . . . custody,” including by paying the expenses of notifying kin or providing for a burial. 142
3.

Contract

Contracts also confer a significant degree of agency to act toward, or on
behalf of, the dead. A particularly common example of this is health-care directives wherein individuals designate agents to control their interment in
death. 143 Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have such statutes. 144 For example, Indiana law allows a designated agent to “[m]ake plans
for the disposition of the principal’s body, including executing a funeral planning declaration on behalf of the principal.” 145 Perhaps because it represents
the will of the decedent, this authority supersedes others’ attempts to direct
the disposition of the body, including that of family members. 146
Some obligations toward the dead arise by means of express and implied
contracts to perform personal services, such as funeral services and burials. 147
Those with a contractual obligation toward the decedent sometimes enforce
that authority through litigation. In the Yome case, for example, when a widow

138. See, e.g., Robyn Ross, Laid to Rest in Huntsville, TEX. OBSERVER (Mar. 11, 2014, 11:34
AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/prison-inmates-laid-rest-huntsville [perma.cc/ERX2MM2U].
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5061 (West 2011).
140. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-831 (Supp. 2020).
141. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:16-7.5 (2021); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY.
SUPERVISION, DIRECTIVE NO. 4013, INCARCERATED INDIVIDUAL DEATHS-ADMINISTRATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY 7–9 (2020), https://doccs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2021/09/4013.pdf
[perma.cc/9TYY-VLU9]; VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-309.2 (2018).
142. 10 U.S.C. § 1483.
143. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (LexisNexis 2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17102(b)(1)(A) (2018); DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 262 (2021); IND. CODE § 30-5-5-16 (2020); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 451.024(1)(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.130 (2019).
144. MARSH, supra note 31, at 47.
145. IND. CODE § 30-5-5-16.
146. See ALA. CODE § 34-13-11.
147. MARSH, supra note 31, at 75.
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attempted to disinter her husband, the religious order that opposed this attempt had signed a contract with the decedent. 148 Much more recently, in Alcor Life Extension Foundation v. Richardson, 149 an Iowa court ordered, over a
family’s objection, the disinterring of a body. The plaintiff was a company that
had signed a contract with the decedent to cryogenically freeze his body.
With this authority to protect the decedent also comes legal obligations
to do the same. Failure to use reasonable care when engaging in contractually
obligated services can give rise to liability by way of tort or contract theories. 150
Plaintiffs have relied on these theories to sue contractors for failing to properly
transport a corpse, as well as negligently embalming or handling a body for burial. 151 In Guth v. Freeland, for example, plaintiffs sued a mortuary for negligent
infliction of emotional distress when, in violation of a written contract, the mortuary failed to refrigerate their parent’s body prior to an open-casket funeral. 152
4.

Community

In at least three respects, a person’s legal relationship to a decedent is also
shaped by their shared community. First, local governments are legally tasked
with providing decent burials for indigent and unclaimed individuals who die
within their jurisdiction. 153 Under New Hampshire law, for example,
“[w]henever a person in any town is poor and unable to support himself, he
shall be relieved and maintained by the overseers of public welfare of such
town, whether or not he has residence there.” 154 Georgia law similarly provides that when a decedent and “his or her family, and his or her immediate
kindred are indigent and unable to provide for the decedent’s decent interment or cremation,” counties shall fund or reimburse the interment or cremation. 155
Second, individuals have common social duties to avoid treating the dead
in ways that would outrage communities or undermine public health. States
outlaw mutilation, necrophilia, grave-robbing, grave desecration, and other

148. Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 127–28 (N.Y. 1926); see supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
149. 785 N.W.2d 717, 730 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).
150. Allison E. Butler, Cause of Action Against Undertaker for the Mishandling of Human
Remains, in 35 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 495, 533–34, § 17 (2007).
151. See id. at 518–19.
152. 28 P.3d 982 (Haw. 2001).
153. Mary Ann Barton, Undertakers of Last Resort: Indigent Burials on the Rise, Denting
County Budgets, NACO (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.naco.org/articles/undertakers-last-resortindigent-burials-rise-denting-county-budgets [perma.cc/WK65-WT86].
154. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165:1 (2014); see also id. § 611-B:25 (Supp. 2020) (requiring that
unclaimed bodies be “decently bur[ied] or cremate[d]” by the authority of local public officials).
155. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-5 (2019).
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conduct likely to outrage community sensibilities 156 or undermine the community’s physical health. 157 For example, when the State of Tennessee codified
the common law crime of abandonment in 1858, the law initially read: “Any
person who wilfully and unnecessarily, and in an improper manner, indecently exposes, throws away, or abandons any human body or the remains
thereof, in any public place, or in any river, stream, pond, or other place, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.” 158 The state later upgraded this crime to a felony. 159
In 1981, the Tennessee Supreme Court observed that the locations identified
in this statute were places that either “offended the public’s sense of decency”
or “exposed the public to the danger of contagious diseases or contamination
of drinking water.” 160
Third, with limited success, members of groups that have experienced violent subordination sometimes attempt to protect the interests of dead members of that group, relying on their shared tribal, ethnic, or cultural heritage.
The most prominent example of this is the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), under which federally recognized Indian tribes may request that federal agencies, as well as institutions receiving
federal funds, return culturally affiliated human remains. 161 NAGPRA is supplemented by the National Museum of the American Indian Act, which includes similar provisions applicable to Smithsonian museums. 162
C. Motive and Fault
When a living person or institution acts toward a dead person, motive
and culpability also influence what conduct is deemed legally (and, likely, culturally) acceptable. At least four features of this phenomenon merit particular
mention: remuneration, deception, mode of culpability, and forfeiture. That
is, the law looks with particular suspicion upon exploiting dead persons for
profit, deceptive acts, knowingly or recklessly harmful acts, and actions taken
by a dead person’s killer.

156. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-113 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1107
(LexisNexis 2016); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5509 (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-8-14 (LexisNexis 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(B) (LexisNexis 2019).
157. State v. Vestal, 611 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tenn. 1981) (Drowota, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 821 (majority opinion).
161. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013.
162. 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q-15.
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Remuneration

“Don’t, for the sake of money, disturb the dead.” 163 Or so urged Michael
Leventhal, the head of a preservation group based in Prince George’s County,
Maryland, when MGM sought to disinter bodies from a colonial cemetery to
build a new casino. 164 Legal action by Black descendants of those buried in
that cemetery proved unsuccessful. 165 But the principle expressed by Leventhal is often reflected in the law of the dead. When a living person attempts
to profit on the back of a dead person’s body or image, this appears to significantly increase the likelihood that courts will deem the behavior unlawful.
This observation especially holds when neither the decedent nor her family
has authorized the exploitation.
In the 1949 case Baker v. State, for example, the State of Arkansas convicted an elderly man’s sole caregiver for indecently handling a corpse when,
over the course of several days, she arranged his body in various positions so
that passersby would think he was alive. 166 The caregiver then cashed his disability check when it arrived days after he died, keeping the proceeds for herself. 167 These facts were sufficient to sustain a conviction and fine for
indecently handling a dead body. The court analogized to a case from the English common law in which a court found that a jailor could be prosecuted for
holding a deceased prisoner’s body and “refus[ing] to surrender it for proper
burial until paid some claimed demand.” 168 The Baker court reasoned that
“the jury could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that [the defendant] held the body . . . and had it placed in positions simulating life until she
received the welfare check.” 169
More recently, in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, families sued the County
of Los Angeles because their “deceased family members had corneal tissue
taken from them and sold for profit without the knowledge or consent of their
next of kin.” 170 By the time of the suit, an eye bank had been giving about

163. Justin Wm. Moyer, ‘Hiding Real Black History’: Lawsuit Fights Plan to Move Historic
Cemetery at MGM Casino’s Doorstep, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/hiding-real-black-history-lawsuit-fights-plan-to-move-historic-cemeteryat-mgm-casinos-doorstep/2017/04/03/18cbbf5e-10b4-11e7-8fed-dbb23e393b15_story.html
[perma.cc/UVR3-V437].
164. Id.
165. Addison v. Peterson, No. 17-cv-00891 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2017) (dismissing the case).
166. 223 S.W.2d 809 (Ark. 1949).
167. Baker, 223 S.W.2d at 811.
168. Id. at 811–12 (citing R v. Fox (1842) 114 Eng. Rep. 95, 97 n.2; 2 QB Rep. 246, 248).
169. Id. at 812.
170. Appellants’ Replacement Brief on Appeal at 24, Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287
F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-55504).
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$250,000 annually to the chief medical examiner’s office in exchange for corneal tissue from dead bodies in their care. 171 A 1997 Los Angeles Times article
reported that the office made $1 million from the practice. 172 In the subsequent federal lawsuit, the families contended that these actions by the county’s
medical examiner constituted a wrongful deprivation of the families’ liberty
and property interests in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ninth
Circuit agreed, observing that “[d]uties to protect the dignity of the human
body after its death are deeply rooted in our nation’s history.” 173
This antiremuneration principle is also supported by the California case
of People v. Reid. 174 In March 2012, Marc Reid stole nine urns containing human remains. He then then discarded the remains “so he could recycle the
metal urns in which they were laid to rest for scrap value.” 175 He was convicted
of theft and disinterring human remains. 176 In sustaining the conviction, the
California Supreme Court noted that the law was sensitive to the outrage and
offense of survivors. The court cited, among other cases, the 1901 case of People v. Baumgartner, which called the act of breaking into grave and searching
a dead person for money “highly reprehensible.” 177
Additional evidence of the role of remuneration can be found in National
Archives & Records Administration v. Favish. 178 In rejecting a request for the
public release of a former presidential aide’s corpse, the court observed that
the family had been besieged by requests from “[p]olitical and commercial
opportunists” who sought “to profit from Foster’s suicide.” 179 The court concluded that “[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they
seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own.” 180
2.

Deception

Deception is also a common feature of cases in which a living person’s
actions toward or on behalf of the dead are deemed unlawful. Deceit is often a
feature, for example, of cases finding that a criminal or civil defendant has engaged in outrageous, offensive, or indecent conduct. When Natalee Holloway’s
171. Ralph Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas at Morgue Questioned, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2,
1997, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-nov-02-mn-49420-story.html
[perma.cc/XY8L-VSYQ].
172. Id.
173. Newman, 287 F.3d at 790.
174. 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 299–300 (Ct. App. 2016).
175. Reid, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 300.
176. Id. at 297.
177. Id. at 300 (citing People v. Baumgartner, 66 P. 974, 975 (Cal. 1901) (“The acts of defendant were highly reprehensible, and perhaps such conduct should be made a felony . . . .”)).
178. 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).
179. Favish, 541 U.S. at 167 (alteration in original).
180. Id. at 168.
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mother was misled to believe that an animal’s remains were plausibly her daughter’s, the deceptive nature of the defendant’s actions played a key role in the
court’s finding that the alleged conduct was legally “outrageous.” 181 The court
explained that the “[d]efendants essentially took advantage of her grief and
tireless efforts to find her daughter’s remains by baiting her with false hope for the
benefit of a television series.” 182 The court further reasoned that the “[d]efendants subjected Ms. Holloway to a sham that took advantage of her grief.” 183
Similarly, in 1995, a Kansas court found that a nurse behaved outrageously when she lured a family into signing an organ-donation form based
on false pretenses, then used the form to engage in far more invasive mutilation than the family contemplated. 184 The family was led to believe that the
decedent’s corneas and bone marrow would be extracted. Instead, the hospital
removed his eyes and major bones from his arms, hips, and legs. In determining that a “person looking at this situation could exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ ” the
court explained that the nurse plausibly “exploited a position of trust and respect gained from a[n] emotionally vulnerable family.” 185 “This deception,”
the court found, “resulted in not only the mutilation of Kenneth’s remains but
frustrated the family’s effort to act as a guardian over the remains and donate
only what they believed Kenneth would have wanted.” 186
Moreover, there is a rarely invoked tradition in the United States of criminally banning false statements against the dead. 187 In 1808, a Massachusetts
court held that it was unlawful “to blacken the memory of one dead . . . and
expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.” 188 Today, seven states
criminalize defamation of the dead. 189 A Kansas law, for example, states that
“criminal false communication” includes “communicating such information
[that the person] knows to be false and will tend to . . . degrade and vilify the
memory of one who is dead and to scandalize or provoke surviving relatives
and friends.” 190 Similarly, Oklahoma law defines criminal defamation of the
dead as “a false or malicious unprivileged publication” that is “designed to
blacken or vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize his

181. Holloway v. Oxygen Media, LLC, 361 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1224–27 (N.D. Ala. 2019).
182. Id. at 1225.
183. Id. at 1226.
184. Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Kan. 1995).
185. Id. at 1561.
186. Id. at 1562.
187. See HERZOG, supra note 13, at 121–27; Raymond Iryami, Note, Give the Dead Their
Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of Action for Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel
Statutes, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1083, 1083 (1999).
188. Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 163, 168 (1808).
189. IDAHO CODE § 18-4801 (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6103 (Supp. 2019); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 14:47 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.510 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01 (2012);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 771 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-2 (LexisNexis 2018).
190. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6103.
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surviving relatives or friends.” 191 These laws are rarely enforced, perhaps due
to the First Amendment implications of applying the law broadly. 192
Deception also plays a role in the law of trusts and estates. When fraud
induces the creation of a living will, would-be heirs may contest the will. In
some cases, heirs argue that someone lied about the document, deceiving the
decedent about what she was signing. In other cases, purported heirs argue
that someone lied to the testator about a fact to persuade the testator to create
or sign a will. Lawrence Friedman has observed, however, that these types of
cases are also rare. 193
3.

Mode of Culpability

As is generally true in American civil and criminal law, the living actor’s
mode of culpability also matters. 194 Knowingly or purposefully causing harm
is more likely to violate the law than negligently causing harm. The tort of
outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress, for example, requires
that “the conduct complained of must be intentional or reckless.” 195 In many
jurisdictions, for an actor to violate criminal prohibitions against desecration,
it must be shown that the actor “knows [the conduct] will outrage the sensibilities of persons likely to observe or discover his action or its result.” 196
Moreover, some state laws that criminally proscribe the mutilation or abandonment of a dead body require a showing that the defendant acted with an
“intent to conceal a crime.” 197
Indeed, law regarding posthumous interests sometimes expressly turns
on the fact that grossly negligent, reckless, and wanton acts and omissions are
often deemed more consequential than merely negligent ones. In Delaware,
for example, in order to hold a funeral home liable “for the mishandling or
mistreatment of a corpse,” one “must allege something more than mere negligent conduct.” 198 Such a finding requires “an extreme departure from the
ordinary standard.” 199 To recover for such a cause of action in Florida, one
must prove willful, wanton, or malicious behavior by the defendant. 200 And in
Ohio, recovery requires a showing that the defendant “acted with a perverse

191. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 771.
192. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964).
193. FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 87–88.
194. See Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1963).
195. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 n.3 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Medlin v. Allied Inv.
Co., 398 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tenn. 1966)).
196. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-113 (2020) (emphasis added); see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 711-1107 (LexisNexis 2016) (including this scienter requirement); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5509 (West 2015) (same); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-14 (LexisNexis 2020) (same).
197. IOWA CODE § 708.14 (2021); WIS. STAT. § 940.11(1) (2019–2020).
198. Gerstley v. Mayer, No. N12C-10-126, 2015 WL 756981, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2015).
199. Id. at *5.
200. Sherer v. Rubin Mem’l Chapel, Ltd., 452 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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disregard of the risk.” 201 One may not recover for a mere “regrettable and unfortunate mistake.” 202 Additionally, Pennsylvania courts do not recognize
negligent mishandling of the body, instead only authorizing suits for intentional or wanton mishandling. 203
4.

Forfeiture

Committing homicide extinguishes one’s legal ability to act toward, or on
behalf of, the victim. Virtually every state has a “slayer rule,” which prevents
killers from inheriting the decedent’s estate. 204 Under Georgia law, for example, “An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills or conspires to kill
or procures the killing of another individual forfeits the right to take an interest from the decedent’s estate and to serve as a personal representative or trustee of the decedent’s estate or any trust created by the decedent.” 205 And under
Pennsylvania law, “No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive
any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent . . . .” 206 Further, in many
states, the killer forfeits the ability to determine the disposition of the victim’s
human remains. 207
III. THE ROLE OF TIME AND INHUMANITY
Children sold away from me, husband sold, too.
No safety, no love, no respect was I due.
Langston Hughes 208

This Part applies the principles extracted in Part II to the discoveries of
the bodies, burial sites, and images of systemically dominated persons. What
happens when, in this context, one looks to traditional considerations like intentions, relationships, motive, and fault? Two consequences follow. First,
201. Winkle v. Zettler Funeral Homes, Inc., 912 N.E.2d 151, 158 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting O’Toole v. Denihan, 889 N.E.2d 505, 519 (Ohio 2008)).
202. Id.
203. Hakett v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d 971, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
204. Carla Spivack, Killers Shouldn’t Inherit from Their Victims—or Should They?, 48 GA.
L. REV. 145, 147 (2013); Nili Cohen, The Slayer Rule, 92 B.U. L. REV. 793, 793–94 (2012); Mary
Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489, 490 (1986);
Karen J. Sneddon, Should Cain’s Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading into the Extended
Slayer Rule Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101, 101 (2007); Kent S. Berk, Comment, Mercy Killing
and the Slayer Rule: Should the Legislatures Change Something?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 485, 486 (1992).
205. GA. CODE. ANN. § 53-1-5 (2021).
206. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8802 (West Supp. 2020).
207. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 97.130 (2019) (“[A] person arrested for or charged with criminal homicide by reason of the death of the decedent may not direct the disposition of the decedent’s
remains.”); see also Minia E. Bremenstul, Comment, Victims in Life, Victims in Death—Keeping
Burial Rights Out of the Hands of Slayers, 74 LA. L. REV. 213, 233 n.137 (2013) (listing states).
208. LANGSTON HUGHES, THE NEGRO MOTHER (1931), reprinted in THE COLLECTED
POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 155 (Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., 1994).
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these considerations can, and do, inform ethical, cultural, and legal claims
when the bodies, burial sites, and exploitative images of victims of prior generations’ mass horrors reenter our consciousness. Second, these traditional
considerations are nonetheless not fully up to the task of answering questions
about what constitutes respectful treatment of these victims. Time and inequality complicate efforts to lift up decedents’ intentions, honor relationships,
and avoid ratifying exploitation. How do we think about a decedent’s intentions when the decedent’s intentions were thwarted and negated by forced colonial rule, brutality, family separation, and erasure? How do we think about
the institution’s “relationship” to the decedent when that relationship was
constructed and enforced by systemic theft, kidnapping, and coercion? And
how do we think of the motive and fault of an institution with wealth and
prestige built on racist exploitation centuries ago that now, perhaps earnestly,
insists it will afford “respect” to the bodies and images of the people it exploited?
A. Intention
On matters of property and burial, American law generally takes the clear,
good-faith intentions of testators seriously. 209 And this same consideration
features prominently in cultural debates when the remains of victims of mass
horrors are discovered. In the late 1990s, for example, there was debate about
how to repatriate and inter the brain of an indigenous man named Ishi, which
was in the possession of the National Museum of Natural History. 210 A central
consideration was “what Ishi himself would have wanted.” 211 Similarly, in
2019, when Philadelphia pastor Jesse Wendell Mapson Jr. learned that a
nearby burial site for escaped slaves was being regularly trampled over, he appealed to the probable intentions of those who were buried: “Everything underneath was crying out, and I didn’t know.” 212 And when UGA dislodged
slaves from their on-campus graves and moved them to a mass grave in a formerly all-white cemetery off-campus, Black local school board member Linda
Davis questioned whether the slaves would have wanted to be buried in a mass
grave next their former masters. She recommended instead, “[a]t some point,”
reinterring them to another cemetery “with their descendants.” 213 Further,
when students demanded that the University of Pennsylvania stop displaying
slaves’ skulls in a museum, among the demands was to “[e]nd the use of data

See supra Section II.A.
Nancy Rockafellar & Orin Starn, Commentary, Ishi’s Brain, 40 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 413 (1999).
211. Id. at 414.
212. Winberg, supra note 6.
213. Lee Shearer, Sting of Death: UGA’s Handling of Baldwin Hall Remains Faces Criticism,
ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Mar. 11, 2017, 11:54 AM), https://www.onlineathens.com/localnews/2017-03-11/sting-death-uga-s-handling-baldwin-hall-remains-faces-criticism
[perma.cc/YQ62-WHJM].
209.
210.
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sourced from the collection without consent and remove all images from the
Museum’s digital footprint that represent the deceased without consent.” 214
But divining the intentions of these victims about their property, burial
or disinterment is difficult. For indigenous persons and the enslaved, there
was not a mere absence of expressed will; there was an active, sustained, systemic negation of that will. A negation of one’s will is part of what it means to
live under colonial rule or to live as a slave. In the 1823 case of Johnson v.
M’Intosh, for example, the Supreme Court confronted whether tribal sales of
land were entitled to legal recognition. 215 Holding that such sales lacked legal
force, the Court reasoned that “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war.” 216 Eight years later, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall further acknowledged that
in a system of colonization, Natives lived in “territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will.” 217 Asserting that title, the federal government and
state militia used force to drive members of the Cherokee Nation westward,
far from their homes and their ancestors’ burial grounds. 218 In Democracy in
America, Alexis de Tocqueville describes observing indigenous persons moving westward on this forced pilgrimage, noting that some were “upon the
verge of death” during the journey itself. 219 What followed was a period in
which “Indian graves were routinely looted, with Indian goods exhumed and
sold to museums and private collectors, many of them ending up in Europe.” 220
What also followed is a century characterized by so many broken promises
that in 1972, over a thousand indigenous persons marched in a caravan from
the West Coast to Washington, D.C., to mark the “Trail of Broken Treaties.” 221
Slaves’ intentions were also routinely negated by law. Slaves could not, for
example, enter marital contracts or pass property to heirs. 222 As the Alabama

214. Abolish the Morton Collection, supra note 44.
215. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
216. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 590.
217. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
218. See JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 275
(1988) (detailing a letter from President Andrew Jackson to the Cherokee Nation east of the Mississippi River expressing the view that the Cherokee people had not acquired “property in the soil”).
219. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 340 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred
A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
220. Angela R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter, Owning Red: A Theory of Indian (Cultural)
Appropriation, 94 TEX. L. REV. 859, 877 (2016); see also Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk,
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992) (describing the systemic looting of indigenous persons’ graves
for body parts throughout the nineteenth century).
221. VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 46–47 (1985).
222. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1716–22 (1993);
cf. DYLAN C. PENNINGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK: AFRICAN AMERICAN PROPERTY AND
COMMUNITY IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (2003) (describing ways that, despite the
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Supreme Court expressed in Malinda v. Gardner, the marital relationship
brings “duties and rights” that “are necessarily incompatible with the nature
of slavery, as the one cannot be discharged, nor the other be recognized, without doing violence to the rights of the owner.” 223 As legal scholar Adrienne
Davis has explained in a deep and rich account of Gardner and related cases,
“the enslaved were not entitled to the estates of their deceased companions,
nor could their children exercise inheritance rights.” 224 And given that system
of domination and erasure, when bodies of long-forgotten slaves are discovered, unearthing their intentions is much more difficult than in the average
legal case about contested wills or disputes about testamentary disposition.
B. Relationship
1.

Kinship

Appeals to kinship frequently characterize discourse about the remains of
victims of mass horrors. 225 In response to the Trump Administration’s blasting of indigenous burial grounds, Ned Norris Jr., the chairman of the Tohono
O’odham Nation asked, “How would you feel if someone brought a bulldozer
to your family graveyard and started uprooting the graves there?” “That is the
relationship, the significance,” he added. 226 Similarly, when the executive director of the Virginia NAACP implored Virginia Commonwealth University
to stop using a slave burial ground as a parking lot, he also made an appeal to
ancestry: “We say get your asphalt off of our ancestors!” 227 And when Tamara
Lanier asked Harvard to stop making use of the images of her enslaved ancestors, her complaint emphasized that she was “their descendant and the rightful owner of images taken without their consent.” 228 My own father’s pleas in
Athens, Georgia, made similar appeals to kinship. 229 Law helps inform and
absence of legal recognition, enslaved persons created informal systems of property ownership
and community).
223. 24 Ala. 719, 724 (1854) (enslaved party).
224. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51
STAN. L. REV. 221, 240–41 (1999).
225. See supra Section II.B.1.
226. Erik Ortiz, Ancient Native American Burial Site Blasted for Trump Border Wall Construction, NBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ancient-native-american-burial-site-blasted-trump-border-wall-construction-n1135906
[perma.cc/B7PU-VDUE].
227. Scott Bass, El-Amin: VCU “Desecrating” Ancestors, STYLE WEEKLY (Sept. 29, 2010),
https://www.styleweekly.com/richmond/el-amin-vcu-odesecrating-ancestors/Content?oid=
1379058 [perma.cc/ZE5Q-BD2K].
228. Complaint & Jury Demand at 2, Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No.
1981CV00784 (Mass. Super. Ct. Middlesex Cnty. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Every day that Harvard maintains those positions compounds the injustices inflicted on Renty and Delia in its name, and
further harms Ms. Lanier as their descendant and the rightful owner of images taken without
their consent.”); see discussion infra Section V.C.
229. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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contextualize these moments, revealing the deep and sustained role of kinship
in determining the proper treatment of the dead. 230
Yet inequality complicates these appeals to kinship. Familial relationships
among subordinated groups have been severely undermined in the United
States through legal erasure and separation. By erasure, I mean failing to take
cognizance of familial bonds, treating such bonds as worthless; by separation,
I mean ways in which families were broken apart. Both concepts are mutually
reinforcing. If bonds are treated as legally worthless, the opportunities for separation increase because of the absence of legal protections that would keep
families together. And with separation comes fewer opportunities to protect
those bonds.
The separation and erasure of families defines much of the indigenous
experience in the United States. After the federal government and states used
mass physical violence to separate Natives from their sovereign territories, 231
the federal government moved to more structural forms of violence. 232 Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the federal government instituted a policy
of removing Native American children from their families across the United
States. 233 The goal of this family separation was to “kill the Indian in order to
save the man.” 234 One scholar has called this practice, which lasted for over a
half century, “education for extinction.” 235 Congress recognized in 1978 that
“there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity
of Indian tribes than their children,” yet “an alarmingly high percentage of
[Indian] children [were] placed in non-Indian . . . adoptive homes.” 236 These
separations were devastating.
In the context of slavery, legal erasure is exemplified by the legal doctrine
of partus sequitur ventrem. 237 Under that doctrine, the offspring of enslaved
mothers belonged to the owner. 238 In the case of Esther v. Akins’ Heirs, for
example, a slave master willed that some of his female slaves were to become

230. See supra Section II.B.1.
231. See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1004 (2014);
JILL LEPORE, THE NAME OF WAR: KING PHILIP’S WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY
(1998); CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, THIS VIOLENT EMPIRE: THE BIRTH OF AN AMERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2010).
232. Blackhawk, supra note 4, at 1802.
233. CHRISTOPH STROBEL, NATIVE AMERICANS OF NEW ENGLAND 157 (2020).
234. DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND
THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928, at 316 (2d ed. 2020).
235. Id.
236. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, § 2, 92 Stat. 3069, 3069 (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)–(4)).
237. See Davis, supra note 224, at 238; see also Harris, supra note 222, at 1719 (arguing that
laws assigning a child’s bondage status to their mother’s condition legitimized the use of enslaved
women’s bodies to increase slaveholders’ property and labor force).
238. Esther v. Akins’ Heirs, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 60, 61 (1842) (enslaved party).
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free at the age of 23. 239 The testator’s will did not explicitly include those female slaves’ children, thereby “doom[ing] Esther, Dudley, and Nancy Jane to
slavery, because, at their births, their mothers were slaves, and the will contains no provision as to themselves.” 240 Likewise, the Gardner case, discussed
in Section III.A, further amplifies this point. Being born into slavery meant
that the would-be heirs in that case lacked, in the words of the court, “inheritable blood.” 241
Families were routinely separated under this system of chattel slavery. 242
Firsthand accounts bring this practice to life. A former slave from Alabama
reported: “Babies was snatched from their mothers’ breasts and sold to speculators. Children was separated from sisters and brothers and never saw each
other again. . . . I could tell you about it all day, but even then you couldn’t
guess the awfulness of it.” 243 In an 1846 interview, when former slave Lewis
Clark of Kentucky was asked about kinship under slavery, he replied, “I never
knew a whole family to live together till all were grown up in my life.” 244 In
1849, a former slave named Henry Bibb described in graphic detail a brutal
scene of mother and children being separated under chattel slavery: “But the
child was torn from the arms of its mother amid the most heart-rending
shrieks from the mother.” 245 A witness to a slave auction later described in a
New Deal–era interview how “[n]ight and day, you could hear men and
women screaming . . . ma, pa, sister or brother . . . taken without any warning,” and how “[p]eople was always dying from a broken heart.” 246
For Blacks and indigenous persons, American institutions have systemically interrupted and impaired the kinds of bonds of kinship that the law presupposes are generally intact. American law tends to make families trustees
for the dead when the decedent’s intentions have not been clearly expressed.
But legal erasure and family separations have had enduring effects that perpetually frustrate lineal descendants’ ability to perform this trustee role. In the
African American experience, early evidence of this enduring effect came in
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, as families looked for one another

239. Id. at 60.
240. Id. at 61.
241. 24 Ala. 719, 725 (1854) (enslaved party).
242. HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750–1925
(1976); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997).
243. HEATHER ANDREA WILLIAMS, HELP ME TO FIND MY PEOPLE: THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN SEARCH FOR FAMILY LOST IN SLAVERY 21 (2012).
244. AFRICAN AMERICAN VOICES: A DOCUMENTARY READER, 1619–1877, at 135 (Steven
Mintz ed., 4th ed. 2009).
245. DeNeen L. Brown, ‘Barbaric’: America’s Cruel History of Separating Children from
Their Parents, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018, 10:43 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/retropolis/wp/2018/05/31/barbaric-americas-cruel-history-of-separating-childrenfrom-their-parents [perma.cc/6WL6-E3PC].
246. Id.
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in their newfound freedom. Historian Heather Andrea Williams has documented and described the ubiquitous correspondence and newspaper ads of
freedmen looking for their kin. 247 This 1865 ad from the Colored Tennessean
is representative: 248

As former slave Sarah Fitzgerald put it, “After the war closed all the Negroes was looking around for their own folks. Husbands looking for their
wives, and wives looking for their husbands, children looking for parents, parents looking for children, everything sure was scrambled up in them days.” 249
Despite their efforts, most freed slaves never reunited with their relatives. 250
Indeed, their efforts were stymied by the fact that slaves had no legally recognized surnames. 251 Moreover, an enslaved person’s unofficial surname
tracked (and changed with) that of their master. 252
Postwar legal and political erasure persisted in ways that further undermined the ability of the formerly enslaved to care for their kin. In the years
after Reconstruction, Black Americans were unable to protect their interests
through the political process because of violent white supremacist mobs and
laws that all but foreclosed voting by Black Americans in meaningful numbers
in some states until 1965. 253 During this era of suppressed political will, segregated and disrespected burial sites for Black Americans proved common. 254

247. WILLIAMS, supra note 243.
248. Id. at 155.
249. Id. at 140.
250. Id. at 172.
251. See PATTERSON, supra note 40, at 56.
252. Id.
253. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter:
The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1427 (2015).
254. See Black History Dies in Neglected Southern Cemeteries, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2013,
5:28 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/30/black-history-dies-in-southern-cemeteries/1877687 [perma.cc/Z3LP-2QTJ]; see also Christopher Petrella, Opinion, Gentrification Is Erasing Black Cemeteries and, with It, Black History, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2019, 10:56
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One example of this can be found at Oakland Cemetery in Atlanta. 255 The
cemetery contains the graves of a number of elite Atlantans over the past century and a half, Confederate insurrectionists who fought against the United
States, and roughly 870 unknown persons buried in the mid-nineteenth century. 256 Aided by an 1852 ordinance that required that Blacks be segregated
from whites, 257 when the cemetery expanded just after Reconstruction in
1877, the Atlanta City Council ordered that the graves of Blacks be disinterred
and relocated to make room for additional whites. 258 The names of those buried have been lost to history. 259 Notably, this treatment in death contrasts dramatically with that of the Confederate site on the same grounds; to this day, it
is illegal under Georgia law to move memorials dedicated to the so-called
“Confederate States of America.” 260
The effects of this history are still felt. When slave burial grounds are discovered, they serve as reminders of mass erasure and separation through dispossession, violence, chattel slavery, and political powerlessness. And kinshipbased legal protections are simply no match for this history. As law-and-humanities scholar Mai-Linh Hong has explained, “For many African Americans, circumstances arising from slavery have obscured family histories: for
example, separation of slave families through sale; laws that prevented recognition of slaves’ patrilineal descent; and the mass migrations that followed
Emancipation.” 261 According to Hong and other legal scholars such as Mary
L. Clark, this history means that in privileging kinship (and the inherited ownership of real property) in the protection of the dead, “the law does not intervene equally on everyone’s behalf.” 262

AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/27/gentrification-is-erasing-blackcemeteries-and-with-it-black-history [perma.cc/9U53-MABL] (describing the broader disparate
treatment of Black graves).
255. D.L. Henderson, Imaging Slave Square: Resurrecting History Through Cemetery Research and Interpretation, in INTERPRETING AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY AND CULTURE AT
MUSEUMS AND HISTORIC SITES 99 (Max A. van Balgooy ed., 2015).
256. CATHY J. KAEMMERLEN, THE HISTORIC OAKLAND CEMETERY OF ATLANTA 20–31,
57–73 (2007); Marcy Breffle, Interpreting Atlanta’s Confederate History, HISTORIC OAKLAND
FOUND. (Aug. 9, 2019), https://oaklandcemetery.com/interpreting-atlantas-confederate-history
[perma.cc/RRY7-CSRE].
257. Henderson, supra note 255.
258. Id.
259. There have been recent efforts to restore the African American section. See Kaitlyn
Lewis, Historic Oakland Foundation Raises Money to Restore African-American Burial Site,
WABE (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.wabe.org/historic-oakland-foundation-raises-money-restore-african-american-burials [perma.cc/K24K-XV6X].
260. GA. CODE ANN., § 50-3-1(b)(1)(B)(ii), (c) (Supp. 2021).
261. Hong, supra note 6, at 93.
262. Id.; see also Mary L. Clark, Treading on Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property
Law and Critical Theory of Land Associated with Human Death and Burial, 94 KY. L.J. 487 (2005–
2006) (describing the disparate application of property-law rules to death and burial sites associated with white versus nonwhite individuals).
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Control

Typically, a government’s custody over a group of human beings increases the state’s legal obligations to them, 263 including after death. 264 And
again, a history of subordination both informs and complicates discourse
about how “control” interacts with respect for deceased victims of mass horrors. In these debates, the arguments are rooted not so much in the view that
control comes with obligations but the view that control, when wrongly invoked or obtained, 265 should not exist at all.
Advocates and protestors commonly ask institutions to relinquish control
of bodies and images obtained through exploitation and violence. In 2017, for
example, the vice chairman of the Tohono O’odham Nation told the New York
Times that the tribe was outraged that the United States government would
deign to build a wall separating members from their ancestral lands. 266 He explained, “If someone came into your house and built a wall in your living room,
tell me, how would you feel about that?” 267 “This is our home,” he added. 268
Relinquishing wrongly obtained control was also the demand of the students who successfully petitioned the University of Pennsylvania to stop displaying slaves’ bodies. In their view, exhibiting and keeping the skulls only
“reproduces” the “white supremacist assumption[s]” of the past, namely, “that
the descendants of enslaved Africans, and of Indigenous, Latinx, and Asian
communities do not have the right to care for their own ancestors[] and that
the desires of imperial knowledge-producers supersede the self-determination
of Black and brown communities.” 269 Or as Georgia political leader and historian Michael Thurmond explained during the episode at the University of
Georgia, “UGA doesn’t own them in death.” 270 These are not requests to
simply exercise better care. These are pleas to stop asserting power over people
who are only in these institutions’ care because of brutality, exploitation, and
caste—brutality that is incompatible with contemporary norms of respect.

263. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976);
see also supra Section II.B.2.
264. See supra notes 139–146 and accompanying text.
265. For a discussion of one interesting dimension of this institutional control, see Rafael
I. Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (2018) (outlining how the federal government sometimes owned slaves under the auspices of bankruptcy law).
266. Fernanda Santos, Border Wall Would Cleave Tribe, and Its Connection to Ancestral
Land, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/us/border-walltribe.html [perma.cc/T72R-FZFJ].
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Abolish the Morton Collection, supra note 44.
270. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Contract

Contracts can enhance a person’s legal duties to the dead. 271 And contractual principles sometimes similarly inform cultural debates as to how to treat
exploited victims of mass horrors. This is especially true in the context of Natives, with whom the United States has entered into treaties and purports to
have a “trust relationship.” 272 This “trust relationship” means that the United
States has duties of loyalty and care toward indigenous persons. 273 In the context of the border wall, the trust relationship has informed arguments about
why destroying these burial sites is disrespectful. When construction in February 2020 disturbed Arizona’s Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument and
affected sacred burial sites, Congressman Raúl M. Grijalva of Arizona reminded the Department of Homeland Security about these obligations: “Regular and meaningful consultation with the Tohono O’odham Nation on the
construction of a border wall and other issues identified by the tribe is essential to maintaining strong government-to-government relationships and fulfilling the federal government’s trust responsibility.” 274
Still, while the trust relationship has sometimes furnished meaningful obligations, Professor Seth Davis has offered trenchant, egalitarian critiques of
this doctrine. 275 He has traced it to Chief Justice John Marshall’s infantilizing
claim in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that tribes’ “relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian” given that they were in “a state of
pupilage.” 276 To avoid perpetuating these roots, Professor Davis urges incorporating into the doctrine principles that better empower indigenous persons
and tribes. 277
4.

Community

Shared community sometimes confers legal agency and obligations concerning dead persons. 278 And this consideration also shapes cultural discourse. In Professor Hong’s detailed, thoughtful analysis of the protests
against Virginia Commonwealth University’s use of a slave burial ground as a
parking lot, she contextualizes the local Black community’s relationship to the

271. See supra Section II.B.3.
272. 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012
& Supp. 2019); see, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
273. Seth Davis, Essay, American Colonialism and Constitutional Redemption, 105 CALIF.
L. REV. 1751, 1776 (2017).
274. Letter from Raúl Grijalva, Chariman, H. Comm. on Nat. Res., to Chad F. Wolf, Acting
Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-01-07%20RG%20to%20DHS%20Border%20Wall%20Construction%20Effects
%20on%20Tohono%20O’odham%20Nation.pdf [perma.cc/NRQ7-UYNN].
275. See Davis, supra note 273, at 1785.
276. Id. at 1776 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)).
277. See id. at 1805.
278. See supra Section II.B.4.
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site. “[I]t is not uncommon,” she observed, “for a descendant of slaves today
to identify with slave ‘ancestors’ through shared history and cultural heritage,
rather than through documentable biological descent.” 279 Moreover, when
tribes request the repatriation of human remains of their members, this is regularly described as bringing them “home.” 280
Important American norms of equality, however, complicate claims of
“shared community.” This is especially true in the context of race. Any legal
privileging of shared racial community must face off with two common
American conceptions of equality: anticlassification and antibalkanization. 281
By anticlassification, I reference the strand of constitutional jurisprudence
that is hostile to any measure that classifies persons on the basis of race. 282 By
antibalkanization, I reference Reva B. Siegel’s argument that the Supreme
Court has often sought to preserve social cohesion by not unduly polarizing
racial and ethnic groups. 283 Either or both of these norms could be undermined by emphasizing shared racial heritage in determining agency and obligations for the dead.

279. Hong, supra note 6, at 93–94; see also Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing
the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 455 n.16 (2008) (citing
CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY 62–66 (1974)).
280. Lucy Fowler Williams, Stacey O. Espenlaub & Janet Monge, Finding Their Way Home:
Twenty-Five Years of NAGPRA at the Penn Museum, EXPEDITION, Spring 2016, at 29, 30; Connie
Hart Yellowman, “Naevahoo’ohtseme”-We Are Going Back Home: The Cheyenne Repatriation of
Human Remains—a Woman’s Perspective, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 103, 110–11 (1996) (“Our people
were finally coming home. After 100 years of unrest, they would be given back to the Mother Earth
and allowed to complete their journey to the spirit world.”); Sioux Chief’s Remains Are Finally
Home, PEORIA J. STAR, Sept. 29, 1997, at A2; see Cliff Tarpy, Pueblo Ancestors Return Home, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 2000, at 118, 125 (“They’re at rest in their home.”); Debra Utacia Krol, Tribes’
Human Remains and Cultural Items Have Been Scattered Across the U.S. Here’s How They Get
Returned, AZ CENT. (June 26, 2020, 12:05 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2020/06/25/how-nagpra-law-helps-return-native-american-remains-tribes/3211191001
[perma.cc/8D4J-MWDF] (“[B]ringing home ancestral remains or sacred and cultural artifacts . . . is a time for rejoicing . . . .”); see also Rebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and the Problem of “Culturally Unidentifiable” Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights Framework, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
809, 884 (2012) (stating that tribal human remains are “entitled to the dignity and respect of
going home to a decent (re)burial”).
281. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1284 (2011); Monica C. Bell, Anti-segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 678 (2020) (“Is the harm of segregation and other forms of
discrimination ‘institutionalized humiliation’? Is the harm of segregation in its demeaning or
disrespectful treatment of people of color? Is the harm at issue national balkanization, not subordination or classification? Is it structural exclusion?” (footnotes omitted)).
282. For critiques of this paradigm, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is
Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1991), and Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”:
Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2007).
283. See Siegel, supra note 281. For a trenchant critique of the antibalkanization framework, see Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015).
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Time also complicates claims of shared community. With time comes the
basic biological decomposition of the body. 284 And with decomposition comes
the irreversible loss of DNA that can link the decedent to living persons. 285
And this means that more community members may have a plausible familial
connection to the body than when specific biological links can be determined.
With more people experiencing a connection, however, comes more likelihood of disagreement. That is, different members of the community, with
equal claims of shared bond, might have different perspectives about the best
way to care for the dead person. Suppose some condone or request reinterment in a well-manicured, formerly all-white cemetery, symbolically breaking
with a history of apartheid and segregation. Suppose others demand that the
bodies be left alone altogether, that their burial grounds be respected rather
than dredged up and desecrated. And suppose others demand that the body
be moved to a formerly all-Black cemetery if the burial ground is to be destroyed, so that probable kin are close together. As time widens the range of
people who might plausibly be counted as the decedent’s community, such
disputes are likely to increase.
C. Motive and Fault
When it comes to the treatment of dead persons, American law is deeply
concerned with motive and fault. 286 Remuneration, deception, culpability,
and forfeiture all make a difference. 287 These considerations similarly color
dialogue about how to treat deceased victims of mass horror. Tamara Lanier’s
complaint against Harvard University, for example, condemns the university’s “capitalization” on a “shameful legacy” and its doing so “at the expense
of truth.” 288 This form of argumentation, common in our cultural discourse,
links the contemporary treatment of slaves to chattel slavery’s deception, avarice, intentional violence, and death.
Yet the passage of time, historic inequality, and egalitarian norms again
complicate this argument in two ways. First, motives and intentions can
change over time. In the University of Pennsylvania example mentioned earlier, the skulls on display were obtained by Samuel Morton without consent
in order to perpetuate lies about racial superiority. 289 Indeed, they were an
attempt to build on the theories of white supremacy perpetuated by Harvard
professor Louis Agassiz, the very person who commissioned photographs of
Tamara Lanier’s ancestors without their consent. 290 But roughly two hundred

284. CANTOR, supra note 31, at 80.
285. Julian Adams, Nuclear and Mitochondrial DNA in the Courtroom, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 69,
70 (2005).
286. See supra Section II.C.
287. See supra Section II.C.
288. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 228, at 4; see discussion infra Section V.C.
289. ABBY L. FERBER, WHITE MAN FALLING: RACE, GENDER, AND WHITE SUPREMACY 31 (1998).
290. See id. at 30–31; Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 228, at 7.
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years later, these elite institutions promise that their motives and goals are less
sinister. In the summer of 2020, for example, when the University of Pennsylvania disestablished the museum exhibition featuring stolen skulls of persons
who died as slaves in Cuba centuries ago, the university acknowledged that
“this museum was built on colonialism and racist narratives” 291 but committed
to working towards “repatriation or reburial” of these human skulls in an “ethical and respectful manner.” 292 And Harvard put together a commission several
years ago to study slavery and untie itself from its historical relationship to it. 293
Second, what is respectful, and what outrages the average community member, can change dramatically over time. It was once the norm to treat Black dead
bodies with radically different respect than white bodies. As one newspaper described following a lynching of Sam Hose, for example, “Before the body was
cool, it was cut to pieces, the bones were crushed into small bits, and even the
tree upon which the wretch met his fate was torn up and disposed of as ‘souvenirs.’ ” 294 When it comes to contemporary treatment of these very same bodies, are
our conceptions of “outrage” capacious enough, and historically literate enough,
to appreciate the unequal dishonor, destruction, and degradation these bodies
already faced for centuries in life and in death? Should they be? Can they be?
IV. THE ROLE OF TIME AND EQUALITY
Then another century came.
People like me forgot their names.
Jericho Brown 295
[T]he incommensurable weight of the unreckoning is pressing down. The heft of
history is too heavy to toss aside, to float away.
Cheryl I. Harris 296

When a slave burial site was discovered in Philadelphia in 2019, journalist
Michaela Winberg observed, “Most of us would probably argue it’s wrong to
desecrate anyone’s grave, but when it comes to the generation in question—
African Americans who died in the mid-to late-1800s—many consider it es-

291. Penn Museum: Statement on Recent Events, PENN MUSEUM, https://www.penn.museum/solidarity [perma.cc/B97H-5652].
292. Morton Cranial Collection, PENN MUSEUM, https://www.penn.museum/sites/morton
[perma.cc/4J7H-FEQ5].
293. Colleen Walsh, Understanding Harvard’s Ties to Slavery, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 28,
2017), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/02/understanding-harvards-ties-to-slavery
[perma.cc/Y5MU-HX2S].
294. Negro Burned Alive in Florida; Second Negro Then Hanged, SPRINGFIELD WKLY.
REPUBLICAN, Apr. 28, 1899, reprinted in RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS 12, 12 (1988).
295. Jericho Brown, ’N’em, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/nem-poem-jericho-brown.html [perma.cc/4T5F-BCY8].
296. Cheryl I. Harris, Reflections on Whiteness as Property, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2020).
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pecially egregious. The forgotten black bones belonged to a generation of former slaves . . . .” 297 On this view, disrespecting the bodies of long-ago former
slaves has special significance. It is a perspective that appears to be widely
shared. When, as described previously, the University of Pennsylvania agreed
to remove the skulls of fifty-three slaves from the Morton Cranial Museum, the
University simultaneously decided to leave well over a thousand other skulls on
display. 298 But what accounts for this disparate approach? As Part III reveals,
traditional considerations (consent, relationship, motive, and fault) cannot entirely explain the view that mistreating dead victims of identity-based mass horrors is distinct (in kind or degree) from other forms of postdeath treatment.
In navigating this puzzle, this Part will not focus on (eminently reasonable) accounts of why it harms living persons to engage in unduly disrespectful
or exploitative postures toward the bodies and images of slaves. One could
argue, for example, that the mere fact that mistreating slaves provokes more
outrage is enough reason for legal and policy intervention, given that protecting public peace is an important goal of law. 299 Moreover, as I have written
elsewhere, identity-based maltreatment of the dead can stigmatize, terrorize,
and civically deflate living individuals who share that identity. 300 But the focus
here is on a different question: How and why does this past injustice shape our
intuitions about how slaves should be treated posthumously? When we lift the
proverbial hood off of the heightened outrage that people express when those
bodies and images are mistreated, what fuels the outrage?
In this Part, I argue that America’s historically rooted collective memory
is important in anchoring and orienting the nation’s cultural identity, that the
shape of a people’s memory or legacy can be damaged posthumously, and that
some groups’ legacies have faced subordination and disproportionate harm
through legal erasure, familial separation, and starkly skewed information
campaigns. In consequence, present-day individuals and institutions can engage in conduct that posthumously harms these groups by reinforcing their
marginal status in our nation’s memory and should seek to avoid this kind of
posthumous subordination when dealing with the bodies, burial sites, and images of such groups. Legal, philosophical, and sociohistorical arguments synergistically buoy this thesis.

297. Winberg, supra note 6.
298. Morton Cranial Collection, supra note 292.
299. Courts have sometimes relied on this rationale to sustain convictions for posthumous
criminal defamation. See supra notes 187–192 and accompanying text; see also Commonwealth
v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277, 281 (Pa. 1812) (“[L]ibel even of a deceased person is an offence against
the public, because it may stir up the passions of the living and produce acts of revenge.” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Herrick, 3 CRIM. L. MAG. 174, 179 (1882) (N.J. Passaic Cnty. Ct. 1881)
(holding that prosecution must prove that the defamed was recently deceased and left “contemporaries” who may be induced to violence).
300. Smith, supra note 13, at 1518–19.
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A. Law, Time and Equality
1.

Time After Death

My prior work has defined “posthumous memory” as “the psychic impression and influence that persons continue to occupy after death.” 301 Law
protects three aspects of one’s individual memory after death. First, law protects memory as creation, allowing individuals’ families or estates to control
how those creations may be used and whether the creator continues to receive
attributive credit. That is, courts sometimes recognize the right of a dead person’s family or estate “to control, preserve and extend his status and memory
and to prevent unauthorized exploitation thereof by others,” while also acknowledging that public figures leave an important impression on the public’s
collective memory. 302 Second, the law has sometimes protected memory as
reputation, by protecting privacy, prohibiting actions that “blacken the
memory of [the] dead,” 303 and pardoning dead persons. 304 Third, law protects
memory as dignity. For example, laws against desecration of human remains
and graves reflect presumptive “respect . . . for the memory of the dead.” 305
Across all three dimensions, however, this individualized protection of
one’s memory has something of a shelf life. 306 Copyright provides one example of temporal limitations on protection of creations. Copyright law protects
works that result from one’s authorship and original creative judgment. 307 It
is impermissible to reproduce the protected aspects of such works without the
permission of the author. 308 Still, this protection is not temporally boundless.
Copyright protection generally lasts seventy years after the death of the author, 309 or ninety-five years from the date the copyright was originally secured
for works created prior to 1978. 310 In addition to copyright protections, about

301. Id. at 1508.
302. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697,
706 (Ga. 1982).
303. Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 163, 168 (1808).
304. Darryl W. Jackson, Jeffery H. Smith, Edward H. Sisson & Helene T. Krasnoff, Bending
Toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon of Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 1251,
1278 (1999).
305. McDonald v. Butler, 74 S.E. 573, 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1912).
306. In the law of the dead, there are many examples of what Elizabeth Cohen calls “countdown deadline[s] in which a boundary is linked to two dates by a precise quantity of time.”
ELIZABETH F. COHEN, THE POLITICAL VALUE OF TIME: CITIZENSHIP, DURATION, AND
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 56 (2018).
307. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 1: COPYRIGHT BASICS (2021), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf [perma.cc/96MA-RAPA].
308. Id.
309. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
310. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
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thirty states create a property interest in a person’s name or likeness, protecting those interests from commercial exploitation without permission. 311
About twenty-five states protect those interests posthumously. 312 But here too
states often place temporal limitations on the posthumous application of the
right. While these limits range from ten years to forever, 313 one federal court
recently observed that the median is fifty years. 314
There are also temporal limits on some protections for individualized
memory in the context of reputational and dignitary interests. Posthumous
defamation of the recently dead was a crime under the common law. 315 Today,
Rhode Island law provides a cause of action for defamatory obituaries published within three months of a person’s death. 316 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services, is another example of this kind
of temporal limit. 317 That regulation protects individually identifiable health
information for fifty years after a person’s death. 318 The Department has reasoned that this temporal choice “balances the privacy interests of surviving
relatives and other individuals with a relationship to the decedent, with the
need for archivists, biographers, historians, and others to access old or ancient
records on deceased individuals for historical purposes.” 319 As the Department explained when it adopted the fifty-year rule in 2013:
We believe 50 years is an appropriate period of protection for decedent
health information, taking into account the remaining privacy interests of
living individuals after the span of approximately two generations have

311. JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC
WORLD 87 (2018); see also Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 294 (2005); Sheldon W. Halpern, Essay, The Right of Publicity:
Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 853, 854 (1995); Haelan Lab’ys v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
312. ROTHMAN, supra note 311, at 87.
313. Id. at 98; Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Gen. Motors LLC, 903 F. Supp. 2d 932, 939–
40 (C.D. Cal. 2012), vacated, No. CV-10-3790, 2015 WL 9653154 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015); Erik
W. Kahn & Pou-I “Bonnie” Lee, “Delebs” and Postmortem Right of Publicity, LANDSLIDE,
Jan./Feb. 2016, at 10, 11 [perma.cc/YM2R-A4S2].
314. See Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
315. State v. Herrick, 3 CRIM. L. MAG. 174 (1882) (N.J. Passaic Cnty. Ct. 1881).
316. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7.1-1 (2012); see HERZOG, supra note 13, at 258–66.
317. While privacy and reputation are decidedly distinct interests, there is little doubt that
the protection of one’s private information can help prevent the release of information that can
undermine one’s reputation.
318. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020).
319. Health Information of Deceased Individuals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
(June 8, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/guidance/document/health-information-deceased-individuals [perma.cc/S46C-9JUM].
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passed, and the difficulty of obtaining authorizations from a personal representative of a decedent as the same amount of time passes. 320

Temporal limits also structure protections for some posthumous dignitary interests beyond privacy. This is illustrated by regulations concerning
when a cemetery is deemed “abandoned,” which in some places subjects those
buried there to a greater risk of disinterment. For example, in Arkansas, one
condition that must be satisfied to demonstrate that a cemetery is abandoned
is that “there have been no interments for a period of fifteen (15) years.” 321
One consequence of such abandonment is that a state court may order removal of the dead from the cemetery, so long as the petition for removal is
published in the local newspaper. 322
But while individualized protections for memory often diminish over
time, protections in service of our collective memory tend to increase over
time. By “collective memory,” I invoke the concept pioneered by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. Drawing inspiration from Émile Durkheim, 323
Halbwachs observed that “it is in society that people normally acquire their
memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their
memories.” 324 He contended that collective memory is “essentially a reconstruction of the past [that] adapts the image of ancient facts to the beliefs and
spiritual needs of the present.” 325 This construction happens, in part, through
words 326 and traditions. 327 Collective memory is also constructed through
law’s official narratives, 328 trials, 329 and even doctrines. 330

320. Modifications to the HIPPA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013).
321. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-905(e)(3) (2018).
322. Id. § 20-17-905(b)–(c) (2018).
323. Joachim J. Savelsberg & Ryan D. King, Law and Collective Memory, 3 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 189, 191 (2007).
324. MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 38 (Lewis A. Coser ed. & trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1992) (1952)).
325. Katherine M. Franke, The Uses of History in Struggles for Racial Justice: Colonizing the
Past and Managing Memory, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1673, 1676–77 (2000) (citing MAURICE
HALBWACHS, LA TOPOGRAPHIE LÉGENDAIRE DES ÉVANGILES EN TERRE SAINTE: ÉTUDE DE
MÉMOIRE COLLECTIVE 9 (1941)).
326. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 31 (1993).
327. See Patrick H. Hutton, The Role of Memory in the Historiography of the French Revolution, 30 HIST. & THEORY 56, 58 (1991).
328. See Brian F. Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory: The State, the Individual,
and Marcel Proust, 80 IND. L.J. 605, 657 (2005).
329. Costas Douzinas, History Trials: Can Law Decide History?, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
273, 274 (2012).
330. Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1998 (2003); Yifat Gutman, Memory Laws: An Escalation in Minority Exclusion or a Testimony to the Limits of State
Power?, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 575, 576 (2016).
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American law protects significant contributions to this shared set of societal recollections. Temporal limitations on the posthumous right to publicity,
for example, are intended to protect the broader public’s ability to own and
control the collective narratives through which they view the world. As one
leading treatise has explained, one’s individual memory must at some point
give way to free speech and our collective memory. 331 Put differently, “the person’s identity should enter the public domain as a part of history and folklore.” 332
Beyond intellectual property, historic-preservation laws represent perhaps the best example of law providing more protection over time to physical
structures and burial grounds. One of the most well-known features of the law
of historic preservation is the “fifty-year rule.” 333 Under this rule, a structure
is not eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places unless
it is fifty years old or has achieved “exceptional importance.” 334 Additionally,
a number of states provide special protection for cemeteries that are deemed
historic. Under Hawaiʻi law, “[a]t any site, other than a known, maintained,
actively used cemetery[,] where human skeletal remains are discovered or are
known to be buried and appear to be over fifty years old, the remains and their
associated burial goods shall not be moved without the [state’s] approval.” 335
New Jersey law allows local governments to create a special fund for the “restoration, maintenance and preservation of any historic cemetery.” 336 And in
Oregon, the Commission on Historic Cemeteries maintains a list of historic
cemeteries, works to rehabilitate them, and is charged with “promot[ing] public education relating to historic cemeteries.” 337
2.

Toward Equality After Death

Throughout American history, institutions have engaged in the unequal
treatment of dead bodies as a means of enforcing identity-based stratification.
Segregated cemeteries were common in the colonies. 338 Scholars such as Angelika Krüger-Kahloula have observed that placing Blacks at the periphery of
cemeteries alongside “paupers” and “criminals” during colonial times communicated their status at the “lowest rung of the ladder.” 339 This kind of segregation lasted deep into the life of the Republic, including after the abolition
331. See MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 17, § 9:16, at 458–59.
332. Id.
333. John H. Sprinkle, Jr., “Of Exceptional Importance”: The Origins of the “Fifty-Year Rule”
in Historic Preservation, PUB. HISTORIAN, Spring 2007, at 81.
334. Id.
335. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6E-43 (LexisNexis 2017).
336. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:10B–3 (West 2016).
337. OR. REV. STAT. § 97.780 (2019).
338. GLENN A. KNOBLOCK, AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORIC BURIAL GROUNDS AND
GRAVESITES OF NEW ENGLAND 155 (2016); Angelika Krüger-Kahloula, On the Wrong Side of the
Fence: Racial Segregation in American Cemeteries, in HISTORY AND MEMORY IN AFRICANAMERICAN CULTURE 130, 133 (Geneviève Fabre & Robert O’Meally eds., 1994).
339. Krüger-Kahloula, supra note 338.
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of slavery. Most starkly, state and local governments throughout the South
enacted laws prohibiting integrated cemeteries in the late 1800s and early
1900s. 340 For example, a Birmingham law banned “colored” paupers and
white paupers from being buried in the same public grounds. 341 A Louisiana
law went even further, dictating that Black and white corpses were to be transported in separate train cars. 342 Outside the South, racially restrictive covenants were used to enforce segregation in cemeteries. 343 Until the 1960s, for
example, one cemetery near Detroit enforced a covenant that required anyone
buried there to be at least 75 percent white. 344
Identity-based subordination after death has also affected people with disabilities, including discrimination on the basis of HIV status. 345 In the mid1980s, at Hart Island in New York City, the unclaimed bodies of those who
died of AIDS-related causes were initially segregated from the mass graves of
other unclaimed dead. 346 Even after that practice abated, people with HIV
were disproportionately among those who were placed in the mass graves at
Hart Island. As a daughter of one of the persons buried there remarked, it was
“a double indignity to die from such a stigmatized disease and then be buried
in anonymity in a mass grave.” 347 During the same era, as Mark Wojcik documents, funeral homes often refused to serve, or placed unreasonable demands on, families of those who died of AIDS-related causes. 348 These actions
stigmatized the victims’ memory and communicated messages about their social position.
Importantly, ameliorating inequality became one of the defining features
of the law of the dead during the late nineteenth century and throughout the
twentieth century. In 1893, for example, New York prohibited discrimination
based on race in cemeteries, followed by New Jersey in 1898 and Illinois in

340. DONALD L. GRANT, THE WAY IT WAS IN THE SOUTH: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN
GEORGIA 221 (Jonathan Grant ed., 1993) (observing that Savannah, Augusta, Rome, Thomasville, and Albany, Georgia all passed such laws between 1888 and 1911).
341. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GEN. CODE tit. 9, art. II, § 4791 (1930).
342. Krüger-Kahloula, supra note 338, at 143.
343. Seth Freed Wessler, Black Deaths Matter, NATION (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/black-deaths-matter [perma.cc/Y6X4-HVAP].
344. David Sherman, Grave Matters: Segregation and Racism in U.S. Cemeteries, ORDER OF
THE GOOD DEATH (Apr. 20, 2020), http://www.orderofthegooddeath.com/grave-matters-segregation-and-racism-in-u-s-cemeteries [perma.cc/2SEZ-UYZY].
345. See Krüger-Kahloula, supra note 338, at 131.
346. Corey Kilgannon, Dead of AIDS and Forgotten in Potter’s Field, N.Y. TIMES (July 3,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/nyregion/hart-island-aids-new-york.html [perma.cc
/P7NC-G6HC].
347. Id. A recent episode of the television show Pose dramatized these indignities, as two
characters visited the island. Matt Zoller Seitz, Pose Season Two Endures a Deadly Era with Love
and Grace, VULTURE (June 10, 2019), https://www.vulture.com/2019/06/pose-season-2-review.html [perma.cc/NFN7-3YG7].
348. Wojcik, supra note 23, at 400–04.
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1935. 349 Federal civil rights statutes played a significant role in ending formal
race-based discrimination in cemeteries, especially in the 1960s. 350 And later
that century, federal and state laws served to redress discrimination against
persons who died from AIDS-related complications. For example, in 1987, a
New York court held that a law that prohibited public accommodations from
discriminating against the “physically handicapped” applied “to those individuals who have died due to complications associated with the AIDS virus
and to their family members who have been stigmatized by their association
with the deceased.” 351
3.

Memory

Embedded in these areas of law, then, are two guiding principles. First,
the preservation of our collective memory is valuable. 352 Second, institutions
should avoid subordinating the memory of the dead on the basis of race, ethnicity, and disability. And when these two principles blend together, they contain fragments of a theory, linking contemporary egalitarian aspirations with
a past that is rooted in inequality and brutality. If collective memory is valuable, and the unequal treatment of marginalized persons’ memories is detestable, then what does this mean in a society that has, so often, mistreated
marginalized individuals’ memories on the basis of their identity? When we
discover unmarked cemeteries of indigenous persons and slaves, we are confronted with unmistakable evidence of their subordination. Even if the subordination initially happened long ago, their forgotten, neglected bodies serve
as witnesses, testifying to their separate, unequal, subordinated role in our collective consciousness. And once an institution is placed on notice, it is a custodian of these unequally treated memories; its subsequent acts determine its
complicity in the corruption of that memory.
B. Posthumous Subordination
1.

Posthumous Harm

It is, perhaps, enough to say that a nation should guard its collective
memory because that memory is important to a society’s identity and destiny.
But by invoking the notion of “complicity,” I mean to make a broader claim:

349. Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, The Separation of the Races in Public Conveyances, 3 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 180, 186 (1909) (discussing New York law); STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR
123–24, 281 (Pauli Murray ed., 1951) (discussing Illinois and New Jersey laws).
350. Kitty Rogers, Commentary, Integrating the City of the Dead: The Integration of Cemeteries and the Evolution of Property Law, 1900–1969, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1153, 1153–55 (2005).
351. DiMiceli & Sons Funeral Home v. N.Y.C. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 1987 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2858 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 1987), cited in Wojcik, supra note 23, at 410.
352. As Congress articulated in the National Historic Preservation Act, the United States
preserves significant physical evidence of our past because “the spirit and direction of the Nation
are founded upon and reflected in its historic heritage.” 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(1).
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custodians’ treatment of the bodies and images of subjugated, stigmatized deceased persons can render them complicit in additional harm to those victims.
Inherent in that thesis is the controversial proposition that one generation can
become complicit in perpetuating harms against an earlier generation. This is,
at its foundation, a philosophical claim, and one that is inextricably in dialogue with philosophers who have reflected deeply about the viability of claims
that rest on conceptions of posthumous harm.
Indeed, one of the oldest debates in philosophy is whether a person can
be harmed after death. “Being asked whether death was an evil thing,” the philosopher Diogenes replied: “How can it be evil, when in its presence we are
not aware of it?” 353 Epicurus reached a similar conclusion: “Death does not
concern us, because as long as we exist, death is not here. And when it does
come, we no longer exist.” 354 He famously proclaimed: “Death is nothing to
us.” 355 Or as German philosopher Max Horkheimer put it in 1937, “Past injuries
took place in the past and the matter ended there. The slain are truly slain.” 356
In recent decades, philosophers and political theorists have offered persuasive rebuttals to these claims. 357 In 1984, George Pitcher wrote an influential and paradigm-shifting article in which he disaggregated life before death
(“ante-mortem”) and after death (“post-mortem”). 358 He argued that events
can transpire in death that impact the projects one pursued in life. Among
other examples, he invited readers to imagine a father on his deathbed, whose
son promises him that he will bury him in a family plot but then instead donates his body to science. The betrayal is against the person to whom commitments were made while he was alive. 359 “An ante-mortem person can be
harmed by events that happen after his death.” 360
Other scholars have embraced versions of this thesis, including Joel Feinberg, 361 Martha Nussbaum, 362 and Don Herzog. They have explored how

353. 2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS bk. VI, at 68 (R.D. Hicks
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1925) (c. 250 C.E.).
354. Id. bk. X, at 651.
355. JAMES WARREN, FACING DEATH: EPICURUS AND HIS CRITICS 23 (2004).
356. Letter from Max Horkheimer to Walter Benjamin (Mar. 16, 1937), in 5 WALTER
BENJAMIN, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 588, 589 (Rolf Tiedemann ed., 1982) (“Das vergangene Unrecht ist geschehen und abgeschlossen. Die Erschlagenen sind wirklich erschlagen.”).
357. See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 1956–1972, at 82, 83–85 (1973);
THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 4–6 (1979); see also James Warren, The Harm of Death in
Cicero’s First Tusculan Disputation, in THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF DEATH 44, 45 n.1
(James Stacey Taylor ed., 2013) (listing recent analyses of Roman thanatology).
358. George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 183, 183–84 (1984).
359. Id. at 183.
360. Id. at 187.
361. 1 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984).
362. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Damage of Death: Incomplete Arguments and False Consolations, in THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF DEATH, supra note 357, at 25.
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postmortem influences on one’s memory—including one’s creations or reputation—can alter one’s antemortem pursuits. As Nussbaum explains, because
death “interrupt[s] their cherished projects, altering the shape of their lives,” 363
events after death can harm a person, because those events terminate or unduly alter those pursuits. “[I]n many cases, events that happen after a person’s
death can . . . be bad for a person.” 364 Among other examples, she describes a
person who creates a trust, the core tenets of which are deviated from after
death. 365 This alters the arc of the person’s life, even if there are sometimes
sound reasons for such a departure. Rooted in a similar perspective, Herzog
has focused on ways that reputational damage in death can alter the shape of
projects one pursued in life. He hypothesizes about a person who worked toward the creation of a local park and dies before it is complete. 366 Someone
lies about the hypothetical person at his funeral, impugning his character such
that people immediately stop devoting resources to the park. 367 In such an instance, the project pursued by a once-living person is diminished. That is the
harm.
2.

A Theory of Collective Posthumous Harm

The accounts offered by Pitcher, Feinberg, Nussbaum, and Herzog focus
on targeted, individualized betrayals, wrongs, and misfortunes. In Pitcher’s
article, “Mr. Brown’s” son lied to him. 368 In Herzog’s book, a malicious gossiper lied specifically about a park’s advocate, leading a community to ask,
“Who wants to keep working on what’s mordantly dubbed the Child Molester
Park Project?” 369 But it is not difficult to imagine that a posthumous lie about
a group could also alter the shape of a person’s antemortem pursuits. That is,
the treatment of a group’s memory can impact the pursuits of members of that
group. Suppose, for example, the lie at the funeral was not specifically about
the park advocate but about the associates who were helping him build the
park. Or suppose the defamatory falsehood was about an organization (e.g., a
sorority or fraternity) to which the person belonged, altering the decedent’s
reputation by wrongly stigmatizing a group. Could not this lie, too, alter the
shape of the advocate’s antemortem pursuits?
We do not have to merely hypothesize or suppose. In the United States,
slaves had life pursuits that were altered by their collective treatment. As Ira
Berlin contends in Generations of Captivity, “the slaves’ history—like all human history—was made not only by what was done to them but also by what

363. Id. at 35.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 34–35.
366. HERZOG, supra note 13, at 250–51.
367. Id. Herzog also defends a little-known Rhode Island law that bans lies in a person’s
obituary immediately after her death. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
368. Pitcher, supra note 358, at 183–84.
369. HERZOG, supra note 13, at 250.
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they did for themselves.” 370 Without the aegis of the law, they attempted to
build families, create spiritual lives, 371 and become free members of the republic. 372 For example, Lea Vandervelde has taken up the task of documenting
attempts by slaves to formally petition for their freedom. 373
But their ability to pass on this familial, spiritual, and political legacy was
impeded. And the treatment of their bodies was a part of the larger architecture that undermined their ability to contribute their fair and equal share to
our collective memory. Historian Daina Raimey Berry has written of how
slave masters often sold Black bodies to medical schools. 374 In some instances,
Black bodies were dug up from burial grounds without consent so they could
be used as cadavers. 375 Moreover, slaves’ burial sites were ransacked by “grave
robbers” or “body snatchers” who sold bodies to medical schools as well. 376
Anatomists could appropriate the bodies of free Blacks without much risk or
public outcry. 377 Hence, “the bodies of African Americans were once at the
highest risk of being used for anatomy.” 378 The disregard of their bodies was
both a symptom of their stigmatized status and a mode of reifying that stigma.
Today, those neglected, forgotten bodies stand as tangible vessels of slaves’
stigmatized memory.
If one accepts that slaves’ lives and dreams matter, then it also matters
how we treat their memories. If it is harmful to betray one person’s memory
and will, it is all the more harmful for a society to betray millions. If it is harmful to interfere maliciously with a dead person’s dreams of building a community park, then it is infinitely more harmful to interfere with an entire group’s
ability to shape the very character and direction of the nation it calls home.
How we treat slaves’ memories renders us complicit in a unique form of posthumous harm.

370. IRA BERLIN, GENERATIONS OF CAPTIVITY: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN
SLAVES 4 (2003).
371. See ALBERT J. RABOTEAU, SLAVE RELIGION: THE “INVISIBLE INSTITUTION” IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (updated ed. 2004).
372. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCHWENINGER, RUNAWAY SLAVES: REBELS ON
THE PLANTATION (1999).
373. See LEA VANDERVELDE, REDEMPTION SONGS: SUING FOR FREEDOM BEFORE DRED
SCOTT (2014).
374. DAINA RAMEY BERRY, THE PRICE FOR THEIR POUND OF FLESH: THE VALUE OF THE
ENSLAVED, FROM WOMB TO GRAVE, IN THE BUILDING OF A NATION 20 (2017).
375. Id. at 170–71.
376. Edward C. Halperin, The Poor, the Black, and the Marginalized as the Source of Cadavers in United States Anatomical Education, 20 CLINICAL ANATOMY 489, 494 (2007).
377. Id. at 493.
378. HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 117 (2006).
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C. Contextualizing Complicity
1.

Lineal Alienation

Celebrated sociologist Orlando Patterson famously wrote about how one
form of subordination a group can face is “natal alienation,” which occurs
when a group is violently uprooted from its geographic, familial, and cultural
origins. 379 Here I offer a related concept, lineal alienation, to bring focus to the
multidirectional effects of this kind of violent uprooting. To be sure, this kind
of violence affects the rootless subject, who has been deprived of important
dimensions of social meaning. As Patterson explains, a person who is uprooted from claims of birth and ancestry is unable “to integrate the experience
of their ancestors into their lives, to inform their understanding of social reality with the inherited meanings of their natural forebears, or to anchor the
living present in any conscious community of memory.” 380 But this deracination also has effects on, to put it inelegantly, the roots themselves: it posthumously diminishes the collective memory and dignity of the subjugated group.
More concretely, because posthumous social and legal protection depends largely on the care of families and others who have a special relationship
with the deceased, these protections collapse when descendants cannot engage
in that care. Lineal alienation has inhibited posthumous care repeatedly in the
United States. The history of indigenous persons, for example, has been characterized by disruption through violent dispossession of land and separation
of families. 381 Moreover, in the 1800s, the federal government encouraged and
aided the raiding of Native cultural property and human remains. 382 This dispossession necessarily means that descendants are deprived of burial grounds,
images, and creations of their ancestors. It also means that those burial grounds
and creations are deprived of descendants who might otherwise care for them.
Lineal alienation also describes much of America’s contemptible treatment of people of African heritage in the United States. In life, American chattel slavery treated Black children as the property of white masters who could
be sold at the whims of cruelty and avarice. In death, slaves were often buried
in separate and unequal sites where headstones were scant or nonexistent. 383
Echoes of this past reverberate, in part through the recent discoveries of longforgotten slave burial grounds and convict-leasing sites across the United
States. Even when slave cemeteries are known, the identities of the people buried in them are often unknown. The ornate and reverent tombstones in places
like Oakland Cemetery in Atlanta, for example, stand in stark contrast with

379. PATTERSON, supra note 40, at 5.
380. Id.
381. Sterba, supra note 40, at 47–48; Tsosie, supra note 40, at 1662.
382. Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72 IND.
L.J. 723, 727–28 (1997).
383. See supra text accompanying notes 254–258.
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the unmarked graves of slaves on the same grounds. 384 When a slave burial
ground was discovered in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, historian Valerie
Cunningham lamented, “Well, we don’t know their identity. We don’t know
whose family they were connected to. We don’t know where they came from,
if they were born here. We don’t really know anything.” 385 Lineal alienation
has facilitated the perpetual dishonoring of slaves’ human dignity and further
polluted America’s collective memory about its vile past. As a result, the enslaved dead have fewer trustees to remember and care for their legacy.
2.

Intentional Campaigns

Our collective memory has also been corrupted by intentional campaigns
to skew our national narrative. The starkest example is the veneration of the
Confederacy without equivalent meaningful memorials to the Middle Passage
and slavery. New Orleans mayor Mitch Landrieu has called this a “lie by omission.” 386 Throughout the South, the treatment of slaves’ memories is dramatically overshadowed by the recognition of those who fought to keep them in
bondage.
A recent report by the Southern Poverty Law Center identified over 1,700
Confederate monuments and symbols located across the South. 387 They were
generally created between 1900 and 1930, as a part of an intentional, mass effort to minimize the brutality of chattel slavery and glorify the memory of
those who fought against the United States in the Civil War. 388 Particularly
prominent in that effort were the United Daughters of the Confederacy. 389
Founded in 1894, by 1912 the organization boasted 800 chapters and 45,000
members, predominately of the middle and upper classes in the South. 390
Through their action, advocacy, and resources, they not only secured monuments and memorials but also achieved official recognition of Confederate
Memorial Days that are still honored in former Confederate states and towns.
Moreover, history textbooks of the period presented a “glowing” narrative of
the Confederacy that was “highly sympathetic” to the institution of slavery in
a detached, scholarly tone. 391

See supra notes 256–257 and accompanying text.
Quinton, supra note 6.
SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 191 (twentieth anniversary ed. 2018).
387. Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.splcenter.org/20190201/whose-heritage-public-symbols-confederacy
[perma.cc/9R77-ZSMF].
388. See Miles Parks, Confederate Statues Were Built to Further a ‘White Supremacist Future,’ NPR (Aug. 20, 2017, 8:31 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544266880/confederatestatues-were-built-to-further-a-white-supremacist-future [perma.cc/6DXB-FTV3].
389. FOSTER, supra note 39, at 108.
390. See id. at 172–75.
391. See id. at 116, 184–85.
384.
385.
386.
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These narratives received another boost in the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education. Government officials in the South openly praised the Confederacy,
and they wove the Confederate Battle Flag into the figurative and literal fabric
of their identities and even their state flags. 392 South Carolina state senator
John D. Long spoke of the “unique and added appropriateness [of] hanging . . . this famous and beloved banner in the legislative halls of the . . . first
state to secede from the Union.” He added: “[T]here are those who believe . . . that no cause is lost whose principle is right.” 393
In contrast, there are comparatively few memorials to the Middle Passage,
chattel slavery, or the “slavery by another name” that followed well into the
twentieth century. 394 In 1988, Toni Morrison remarked:
There is no place you or I can go, to think about or not think about, to summon the presences of, or recollect the absences of slaves; nothing that reminds us of the ones who made the journey and of those who did not make
it. There is no suitable memorial or plaque or wreath or wall or park or skyscraper lobby. There’s no 300-foot tower. There’s no small bench by the road.
There is not even a tree scored, an initial that I can visit or you can visit in
Charleston or Savannah or New York or Providence or, better still, on the
banks of the Mississippi. 395

To be sure, there are more memorials today than there were in 1988. 396 A
museum is now being built on the shores of Charleston, near the ports where
those who survived the Middle Passage disembarked. 397 There is even a “small
bench by the road” in Sullivan’s Island, South Carolina, to memorialize slavery

392. James Forman, Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern
State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 505 (1991).
393. K. MICHAEL PRINCE, RALLY ’ROUND THE FLAG, BOYS! SOUTH CAROLINA AND THE
CONFEDERATE FLAG 32 (2004).
394. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008) (describing the continued subjugation and forced labor of Black Americans through convict leasing in
the southern states).
395. Morrison, supra note 1.
396. See, e.g., ANDREA E. FROHNE, THE AFRICAN BURIAL GROUND IN NEW YORK CITY:
MEMORY, SPIRITUALITY, AND SPACE (2015); Elizabethada A. Wright, Rhetorical Spaces in Memorial
Places: The Cemetery as a Rhetorical Memory Place/Space, RHETORIC SOC’Y Q., Fall 2005, at 51,
63–72; Savannah Divided Over Monument, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2001, 12:00 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-feb-10-mn-23539-story.html [perma.cc/E535-WUBS].
In recent years, the New York Times Magazine and the Atlantic have launched public-facing projects designed to document the institution of slavery in the United States. The 1619 Project, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619america-slavery.html [perma.cc/Z2MX-52QA]; Jeffrey Goldberg, Illuminating the Whole American Idea: Introducing “Inheritance,” ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/03/the-atlantic-and-black-history/617784 [perma.cc/4EJN-L2DB].
397. See Tariro Mzezewa & Kim Severson, Charleston Tourism Is Built on Southern Charm.
Locals Say It’s Time to Change., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12
/travel/charleston-tourism-black-lives-matter.html [perma.cc/K83M-XWLZ].
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and honor Morrison’s potent words. 398 Still, monuments and memorials to
the Confederacy outnumber those to slavery and American apartheid. 399
*

*

*

Slaves’ neglected and exploited bodies and images are but two powerful
and tangible dimensions of slaves’ intentionally diminished role in shaping
our national memory. If it is wrong to deny a person of the ability to leave a
legacy on account of her race under contemporary egalitarian norms, then we
ought not engage in posthumous acts that rob slaves of that legacy.
V.

LEGAL REFORMS

[T]he past never cooperates by staying in the past. Eventually it always reaches
out to us and asks, What have you learned?
Valerie Babb 400

We have learned that the “law of the dead” depends heavily on culturally
contingent concepts that can shift with time. 401 We have learned that in the
United States, the predominant concepts that influence posthumous interests
are consent, relationship, and motive. 402 We have also learned that temporality, historical inequality, and cultural shifts in egalitarian norms all make it
difficult to apply those traditional concepts when it comes to the respectful
treatment of victims of long-ago mass horrors. 403 And we have seen how it is
possible for one generation to reproduce and perpetuate mass harm against
deceased victims of an earlier generation—a risk that is escalated by America’s
polluted collective memory and its history of lineal alienation. 404 There is but
one task left: exploring legal reforms that can help avoid remaining complicit
in this harm. That is the work of Part V. This Part will not engage in a com-

398. Felicia R. Lee, Bench of Memory at Slavery’s Gateway, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/arts/design/28benc.html [perma.cc/9JP6-QS3K].
399. See On the Media, Bryan Stevenson on Memorializing Our Country’s Shameful History, WNYC STUDIOS (May 26, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/otm/segments/bryan-stevenson-memorializing-history; cf. Rafael I. Pardo, Federally Funded Slaving, 93
TUL. L. REV. 787, 788 (2019) (“[D]espite the magnitude of this severe assault on humanity, willful
ignorance and social amnesia have been among the enemies that have undermined remembrance of this past.”).
400. Marc Parry, Buried History: How Far Should a University Go to Face Its Slave Past?,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 25, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/buried-history
[perma.cc/V7BE-6YGM].
401. See supra Part I.
402. See supra Part II.
403. See supra Part III.
404. See supra Part IV.
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prehensive exploration of broader ways to remediate harm inflicted upon deceased victims of mass horror. Such an account of spiritual reparations 405 deserves careful attention, beyond what one article could purport to do.
Nonetheless, there are more modest, but important, legal steps we could take
to reduce our complicity.
Four reforms are advanced here. First, when slave cemeteries are discovered, the law should not place exclusive weight on biological kinship when determining whether someone has a legal claim to protect the burial sites from
desecration or disinterment. Second, additional process should be required before laws allow disinterment in disturbed burial grounds. Third, the discretion-laden concepts that order the law of the dead—concepts like “compelling,”
“outrageous,” and “public interest”—should be attentive to America’s history
of violent subordination and lineal alienation. Fourth, policymakers should
invest significantly in monuments, museums, historic preservation, and other
measures designed to counter the corrupted memories about America’s past.
A. Expansion of Cognizable Trustees
When litigants attempt to protect slaves’ burial sites, these efforts are
sometimes encumbered by America’s history of lineal alienation. Because of a
national history of family separation and legal erasure, along with the absence
of meaningful burial records for slaves, it is rare that slaves have contemporary
persons who can prove biological kinship with a high degree of certainty. And
because American law sometimes privileges (or demands) biological kinship
for a person to assert an interest in protecting a dead body, efforts to protect
slaves can be frustrated. This, however, is an avoidable outcome. We should
recognize a broader class of persons who can bring a claim on behalf of the
long dead, including reasonably probable kin who have a sincere, personal relationship to a burial site.
A Virginia case, El-Amin v. Virginia Commonwealth University, demonstrates how lineal alienation can impede legal efforts to protect the memory of
slaves. 406 In that case, Sa’ad El-Amin, a former Richmond city councilman,
filed suit in state court seeking to stop the university from parking cars on top
of a slave burial ground. In his view, it amounted to desecration to park automobiles atop the graves of individuals he believed were likely his family members. At the time, he provocatively demanded that VCU “get [its] asphalt off

405. By this, I mean mass attempts to remediate indignities perpetuated against the memories, reputations, creations, and spirituality of persons who are dead. The intended beneficiary
of “spiritual reparations,” as the term is used here, is the deceased victim. Cf. Smith, supra note
13, at 1546 (“What congressional remedies can be bestowed to dead victims of mass horror? Not
to their descendants, but to the victims themselves: to their distorted memory, to their thwarted
will, to their interrupted spiritual strivings?”).
406. No. CL10-4130 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 2011).
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of our burial ground.” 407 According to a local press account, El-Amin “elongate[ed] the first vowel” of the word “asphalt.” 408 He observed that community members would be outraged if he parked on the graves of Confederate
insurrectionists and that his ancestors deserved the same respect. El-Amin accordingly filed two suits: one was against the director of the state’s Department of Historic Resources asking the state to protect the burial ground; the
other was against VCU and its president, asking them to stop using the grave
site as a parking lot.
Although both suits were dismissed, the second lawsuit is of particular
interest. There, VCU’s demurrer contended that El-Amin had insufficiently
pled that he was biologically related to any of the slaves buried beneath the
school’s parking lot. In the words of the filing, “El-Amin alleges . . . that his
ancestors are ‘likely buried’ there. This necessarily concedes that they may not
be buried there. Consequently, any declaratory relief inevitably rests on a
speculative allegation that tacitly concedes that he may not have any ancestor
buried in the Burial Ground at all.” 409 In response, El-Amin told the court,
“For enslaved persons, the Burial Ground became their final resting place and
they were buried anonymously. As a result of there being no record keeping,
it is virtually impossible today for the living progeny of these unfortunate human beings to directly trace their ancestors’ interment in the Burial
Ground.” 410 Confronted with these competing arguments, the court sided
with VCU, holding that El-Amin lacked standing. The court acknowledged
that El-Amin had an “assuredly ‘personal’ ” interest in the case. 411 However,
the court reasoned, his personal interest in the case was not a “judicially cognizable interest” sufficient to ensure “concrete adverseness.” 412 While a litigant only needs an “ ‘identifiable trifle’ of legal interest to meet that threshold”
under Virginia law, the court explained that El-Amin’s “alleged legal interest
is not sufficient even under [that] standard.” 413 It continued, “Petitioner has
alleged only one connection to the burial site, that his ancestors are ‘likely buried’ there. The attenuated nature of this claim makes it precisely ‘unidentifiable’ . . . .” 414
The court expressly noted that its finding was attributable to slaves’ legal
mistreatment. It recognized “the unique legal difficulties associated with slave
burial grounds,” observing that “the history of legal treatment of slave and

407. Bass, supra note 229.
408. Id.
409. Demurrer at 4, El-Amin, No. CL10-4130-7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 2011) (citation
omitted).
410. Petitioner’s Responses to Respondents’ Demurrer and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Standing at 6, El-Amin, No. CL10-4130-7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Petitioner’s
Responses].
411. El-Amin, No. CL10-4130-7, slip op. at 4.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
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other long-standing African-American burial grounds has been one of neglect
or outright disregard.” 415 As such, the court observed, “to prove that his ancestors are interred in this Burial Ground is akin to ‘proving a factual impossibility.’ ” 416 Still, standing was not satisfied. “[T]he particular legal issue the Court
now faces is not the matter of the Burial Ground itself, but rather the issue of
standing by a certain party to take legal action regarding that Burial Ground.” 417
American egalitarian norms have come to disfavor validating the badges
and incidents of slavery. 418 It is difficult to imagine a more direct incident of
slavery than the disregarded, mistreated bodies of the enslaved. Is this outcome justified by the principles that undergird standing doctrine?
The doctrine of standing undoubtedly protects important interests. 419
The court names one of those interests, namely, that there be sufficiently concrete adverseness between the parties. Adverseness ensures that strong, opposing
legal arguments are provided on both sides, aiding the court in reaching an informed, well-tested conclusion. 420 Adverseness also protects nonlitigants. By
ensuring that the person advancing the claim is a person particularly close to
the legal issue, standing doctrine prevents a person with a marginal interest in
an issue from displacing someone in a better position to litigate the claims
faithfully. Richard Re calls this kind of comparative analysis “relative standing.” 421
Would those interests have been undermined by allowing El-Amin to
proceed? That is, in a cemetery in which the name of every slave buried there
was unknown, is it likely that there were other individuals who had a stronger
adversarial interest that El-Amin, whose ancestors were from that geographic
region? 422 And if not, are there legal standards short of demanding a demonstrable biological relationship that would comport with standing principles
without, in El-Amin’s words, “aid[ing], support[ing], and legitimiz[ing] the
historical treatment of people of African descent as chattel property”? 423

415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1108 (2020).
419. See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845, 915 (2017);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1065–68 (2015);
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 230–31 (1988).
420. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 754–55 (2013).
421. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191 (2014).
422. Others who, for example, had provable biological kin buried there and could present
the issues more sharply than the man who, standing alongside the president of the state NAACP,
implored VCU to get its asphalt off of his ancestors?
423. Petitioner’s Responses, supra note 410, at 7.
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While standing law varies across states, denying standing to someone who
has a voluntary personal relationship with burial grounds is far from inevitable. In ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus, 424 the D.C. Circuit confronted whether a former circus employee had standing to stop the
abuse of elephants based on an “aesthetic and emotional injury.” 425 He contended that he suffered upon witnessing the “mistreatment of the elephants to
which he became emotionally attached during his tenure at Ringling Bros.” 426
The court recognized that he sufficiently alleged standing, citing the employee’s “personal relationship with the elephants,” along with his “desire to
visit the elephants” without seeing the “effects of mistreatment.” 427 This holding was consistent with Justice Scalia’s observation in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife that “the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.” 428
If a voluntary personal relationship with animals is sufficiently concrete
and particularized to render an injury judicially cognizable even under the
strict parameters of federal standing law, it is a negligible step to suggest that
one’s credible, reasonable, voluntary relationship with a dead person in a
graveyard is also concrete and particularized. All the truer for a litigant who
alleges a desire to protect a resting place to which the litigant has geographic
ties and that the litigant plans to imminently visit. Placing exclusive weight on
demonstrable bloodline rather than a sincere relationship to the person and
the site is not an ineluctable approach to standing.
Indeed, when litigants sue to protect sites from environmental degradation,
courts similarly confer standing based on the plaintiffs’ emotional relationship
with the site. “[A] person ‘may derive great pleasure from visiting a certain river;
the pleasure may be described as an emotional attachment stemming from the
river’s pristine beauty.’ ” 429 Is it so different to confer standing on a person with
an emotional attachment to a burial site? Might not a plaintiff have an emotional relationship with a site where she believes her ancestors are buried?
Standing cases about historic preservation also protect individuals’ voluntary, emotional relationship to physical sites. In Sierra Club v. Jewell, a coalition of organizations sued to place the site of the Battle of Blair Mountain
on the National Register of Historic Places. 430 To demonstrate an injury-infact, the organizations needed to “show that the asserted injury to [their]
members is concrete and particularized, and is also actual or imminent.” 431
The D.C. Circuit found that “members who view and enjoy the Battlefield’s
aesthetic features, or who observe it for purposes of studying and appreciating
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
ASPCA, 317 F.3d at 335.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 337–38.
504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992).
Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting ASPCA, 317 F.3d at 337–38).
Id.
Id. at 5.

256

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:195

its history, would suffer a concrete and particularized injury from the conduct
of surface mining on the Battlefield.” 432 Accordingly, those “members possess[ed] concrete interests in appreciating and studying the aesthetic features
and historical significance of a preserved and intact Battlefield.” 433
El-Amin was attempting to protect a burial ground from degradation, a
site toward which he had a strong emotional attachment. The court itself
“note[d] the extremely personal nature of the subject matter.” 434 Just as one of
the plaintiffs in Jewell believed that the site of a labor conflict was “hallowed”
ground, El-Amin was making a similar claim about the burial site. Failure to
prove biological kinship does not negate this “extremely personal” relationship. A more capacious understanding of who can serve as a trustee for the
dead is both possible and warranted.
B. Abandonment Revisited
The cemeteries of slaves are often abandoned, in the factual sense. They
have experienced extreme neglect and fallen out of communities’ consciousness. That is why they are often discovered inadvertently. 435 When burial
grounds are discovered, the human remains found there should receive considerably more procedural and substantive protection than they currently do.
Current law requires that a person aware of the presence of human remains
on a site receive permission before moving the remains. But when these bodies
are discovered inadvertently, bodies can often be moved with little in the way
of procedural or substantive protection.
The episode at the University of Georgia brings this issue into stark relief.
On the face of it, Georgia law provides meaningful protection for burial sites,
even abandoned ones. A Georgia statute provides:
[H]uman remains and burial objects are not property to be owned by the
person or entity which owns the land or water where the human remains and
burial objects are interred or discovered, but human remains and burial objects are a part of the finite, irreplaceable, and nonrenewable cultural heritage
of the people of Georgia which should be protected. 436

As such, Georgia law is to “be construed to require respectful treatment
of human remains in accord with the equal and innate dignity of every human
being and consistent with the identifiable ethnic, cultural, and religious affiliation of the deceased individual as indicated by the method of burial or other
historical evidence or reliable information.” 437

432.
433.
434.
24, 2011).
435.
436.
437.

Id.
Id. at 6.
El-Amin v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., No. CL10-4130, slip op. at 4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
GA. CODE ANN. § 36-72-1 (2019).
Id.
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Consistent with these intentions, under Georgia law, “No known cemetery, burial ground, human remains, or burial object shall be knowingly disturbed by the owner or occupier of the land . . . unless a permit is first
obtained . . . .” 438 For most actors, this kind of permit may be obtained from
the “municipal corporation or county wherein the cemetery or burial ground
is located.” 439 When the state is the entity seeking to disturb the site, the permit
must be sought and granted by a court of general jurisdiction. 440 Among other
things, the application for a permit must include “[a] plan prepared by a genealogist for identifying and notifying the descendants of those buried or believed to be buried in such cemetery.” 441 Further, “If the proposal includes
relocation of any human remains or burial objects, the proposal shall specify
the method of disinterment, the location and method of disposition of the remains, the approximate cost of the process, and the approximate number of
graves affected.” 442
Before the relevant governing authority may issue a permit, it must hold
a public hearing. 443 Additionally, the authority “shall” consider the following
factors:
(1) The presumption in favor of leaving the cemetery or burial ground undisturbed; (2) The concerns and comments of any descendants of those buried in the burial ground or cemetery and any other interested parties; (3) The
economic and other costs of mitigation; (4) The adequacy of the applicant’s
plans for disinterment and proper disposition of any human remains or burial objects; (5) The balancing of the applicant’s interest in disinterment with
the public’s and any descendant’s interest in the value of the undisturbed
cultural and natural environment; and (6) Any other compelling factors
which the governing authority deems relevant. 444

Finally, a county or municipal government’s issuance of a permit is appealable. 445 The human remains must generally remain undisturbed during the
pendency of the appeal. 446
None of this happened when slaves’ bodies were discovered at the University of Georgia. No permit was sought, let alone granted. No governing authority—judicial or otherwise—held a hearing where probable descendants
and other interested parties could make their case. No governing authority
evaluated the legitimacy of the university’s decisions with respect to whether
or how to reinter the bodies. Perhaps a court would have endorsed the university’s decision to dig up the bodies, put them in moving trucks without
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

Id. § 36-72-4.
Id.
Id. § 36-72-14.
Id. § 36-72-5.
Id.
Id. § 36-72-7.
Id. § 36-72-12.
Id. § 36-72-11.
Id. § 36-72-12.
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alerting the public, and place them in a mass grave in a formerly all-white
cemetery. 447 But no court was ever asked.
No permit was required because the discovery of the graves was purportedly unintentional. As the ad hoc faculty committee appointed to investigate
the incident explained explained, “[P]recisely because the discoveries were accidental, they were subject to less stringent regulation than if they had been
detected prior to the start of construction. . . . [I]n this particular case, because
these discoveries were accidental, UGA was free to move them without acquiring permits.” 448 By failing to care for a cemetery full of people who were
violently forced to build the university, and by neglecting it for so long that
members of the administration were unaware that slaves were buried there,
the university avoided having to apply for a permit. It avoided a public hearing, where the presumption would have been against reinterment and where
the compelling story of the people who built UGA could have been told. It
avoided meaningful, transparent review of its plans. It avoided all this because
it forgot where its slaves were buried.
A sounder approach would be to require a permit to disinter human remains, even those that are inadvertently discovered. If “human remains and
burial objects are a part of the finite, irreplaceable, and nonrenewable cultural
heritage of the people of Georgia which should be protected,” 449 it is not apparent why that cultural heritage is less important when dealing with bodies
that were so badly neglected that we “forgot” where they were buried. If it is
important to afford “respectful treatment of human remains in accord with
the equal and innate dignity of every human being,” 450 it is not clear why protection should be unavailable to unrecorded, legally erased slaves. Even if their
equal dignity was not respected in times past, that hardly furnishes grounds
for disregarding their dignity today. But in a sense that is precisely what happened. The failure to protect and record the slaves’ burial site meant that their
bodies had very little legal protection when they were discovered.
C. Historically Informed Balancing
The law of the dead is replete with standards that allow for considerable
discretion. In the UGA example, if a permit had been sought, a court would
have considered the “adequacy” of the disinterment plans, “the public’s and
any descendant’s interest[s],” as well as “[a]ny other compelling factors which
the governing authority deems relevant.” 451 In addition to the procedural protections advanced in Section V.B, courts should take history into account
when deciding what is adequate, compelling, in “the public interest,” reason-

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

UGA BALDWIN HALL REPORT, supra note 43, at 54–58.
Id. at 11.
GA. CODE. ANN. § 36-72-1 (2019).
Id.
Id. § 36-72-8.

November 2021]

On Time, (In)equality, and Death

259

able, or even outrageous. Failure to do so can reinforce the treatment marginalized groups have experienced in the past, further subordinating them in our
collective memory.
Lanier v. Harvard University offers a helpful legal context for exploring
this potentiality. 452 In 2019, Tamara Lanier sued Harvard University for possessing, using, and financially profiting from images of her deceased family
members. Featured in the photographs are Renty and Delia, both of whom
were slaves when the photos were taken. The photographs were commissioned by Harvard professor Louis Agassiz, an early eugenicist who attempted
to prove the inherently “subhuman” nature of nonwhites. 453 Lanier’s lawsuit
relies on multiple theories of liability, including that Harvard lacks legal title
to the photographs, that the photos are being used without authorization, that
use of the photos violates federal and state civil rights laws, and that Harvard
is engaging in the negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as conversion and unjust-enrichment claims. 454
Almost two years after the complaint was filed, the trial court dismissed
all of Lanier’s claims. 455 In the dismissal, the court categorized most of the
allegations as “property-related claims.” 456 According to the court, “It is a
basic tenet of common law that the subject of a photograph has no interest in
the negative or any photographs printed from the negative . . . ; rather, the
negative and any photographs are the property of the photographer.” 457
Curiously, however, one of Lanier’s claims that the court treated as “property-related” is in fact a tort claim: negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Under the tort of negligence, individuals have a duty to “exercise that degree of
care as would be exercised by a reasonable person under the circumstances.” 458

452. Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 1981CV00784 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Middlesex Cnty. Mar. 1, 2021), appeal docketed, No. SJC-13138 (Mass. June 30, 2021).
453. Louis Menand, Morton, Agassiz, and the Origins of Scientific Racism in the United
States, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Winter 2001/2002, at 110, 110–13.
454. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 228, at 19–22.
455. Lanier, slip op. at 14.
456. Id. at 5.
457. Id. at 11 (citation omitted). The court acknowledged that the circumstances in which
the photographs were taken informed the nature of Lanier’s claims. The subjects of the photograph were, after all, stripped of their right to consent to the use of their images during the barbaric context of chattel slavery. And the photographs were taken by an employee of the
defendant to dehumanize Renty, Delia, and others of African descent. The trial court concluded,
however, that adopting legal principles that accounted for this context needed to come from the
legislature or a higher court. In the words of the court, “Fully acknowledging the continuing impact
slavery has had in the United States, the law, as it currently stands, does not confer a property interest to the subject of a photograph regardless of how objectionable the photograph’s origins may
be. Unfortunately, this Court is constrained by current legal principles . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).
458. 2A STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS § 9:3, at 312 n.7 (quoting Walker v. Bignell, 301 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Wis. 1981));
see also Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Recovery Under State Law for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander Plaintiff Must Suffer
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Treating this type of tort claim as a matter of property law was a severe,
and perhaps consequential, misstep by the trial court. The unreasonable publication or treatment of sensitive photographs—regardless of who owns
them—has sometimes furnished a basis for tort liability. 459 The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has been recognized, for example, when a
school negligently allowed students to display sexually derogatory photographs of the plaintiff in a manner that contributed to her harassment. 460 Likewise, publication of gruesome photographs of human remains has given rise
to liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 461 To be sure, such
cases can only teach us so much. The photographs of Renty and Delia, while
debasing and dehumanizing, are not alleged to have been sexually derogatory.
And while the forced, degrading photographs capture them in a state of “social
death” 462 and “civil death,” 463 they do not depict Renty and Delia’s physical
death. These types of cases are nonetheless clarifying because they show that
this tort has sometimes been recognized for the handling or publication of
sensitive photographs, without regard to who owned them.
More broadly, many principles that traditionally guide considerations
about treatment of the dead count against the university’s continued use of
photographs of Renty and Delia, considerations like decedent’s intent, relationship, motive, and culpability. Neither Renty nor Delia consented to be
photographed, 464 the person seeking to terminate the use of the photographs
is Renty and Delia’s closest living kin, 465 the photographs were taken in an
attempt to perpetuate falsehoods about Black inferiority, 466 and Harvard has

Physical Impact or Be in Zone of Danger, 89 A.L.R.5TH 255, 289 (2001) (“[T]he scope of a defendant’s duty is limited to injuries that are the foreseeable result of the defendant’s carelessness.”); 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance § 4 (2019) (“If the actor
unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he or she is subject to liability to the other
for resulting illness or bodily harm . . . .”).
459. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Barber v. Time, Inc.,
159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942); cf. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
460. Tyrrell v. Seaford Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV-08-4811, 2010 WL 1198055
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010).
461. Catsouras v. Dep’t of the Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 335 (Ct. App. 2010).
But see Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d 333, 335 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding that invasion of
familial privacy, rather than negligence, was the proper tort to invoke under such circumstances).
462. See generally PATTERSON, supra note 40 (describing American chattel slavery as imposing a system of social death on the enslaved).
463. “Civil death is the status of a person who has been deprived of all civil rights.” Legislative Note, Civil Death Statutes—Medieval Fiction in a Modern World, 50 HARV. L. REV. 968
(1937). In the American and English common law traditions, civil death was sometimes imposed
as a punishment for some forms of crime. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1793–94 (2012). Chattel slavery,
by its nature, imposed civil death, depriving slaves of all civil rights.
464. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 228, at 1.
465. Id. at 3–4.
466. Id. at 7.
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profited from the photographs in recent decades. 467 According to the complaint,
Harvard’s conduct—including but not limited to its use of the daguerreotypes
for profit, refusal to engage in good faith with Ms. Lanier, its denial of her
claim of lineage, and its deception about the images’ provenance—was undertaken in negligent or reckless disregard for how it would affect Ms. Lanier. 468

As this Article has argued, in assessing a claim like Lanier’s, courts should
remember that foreseeability and reasonable care are concepts that can shift
across time in light of shifting values. This includes egalitarian values. When
Agassiz commissioned photographs of Renty and Delia to prove his theory of
white supremacy, he did so in a context in which it was legal to hold Black
persons in bondage as chattel. Members of the politically and socially dominant class might not have been concerned with the distress it would cause to
profit from Renty and Delia’s pain, let alone their families’ pain. However,
values about racial equality have changed markedly over time. And accordingly, it is highly plausible that today there is a broader range of conduct that
would tend to foreseeably distress a slave’s surviving family members.
On this theory, then, our legal system should ask more than whether a
reasonable institution would know that a great-great-great-grandchild would
be distressed by the decision to profit from unauthorized photography. Courts
should take into account the motives behind the photograph, the legal and
social context of the photograph, and the violent nature of the slavery that
facilitated the photograph. All of this contextualizes the distress and outrage
expressed by a descendant of slaves when her ancestors’ bodies and images are
mistreated. And the more these descendants express their pain, the more foreseeable this distress becomes. To ignore this context in assessing what is reasonable is to be complicit in past horror.
D. Investing in Memory
“We imagine the past to remember the future.” 469 Our architecture, topography, words, and laws are a living museum filled with reminders of the
past. For example, Sanford Levinson reminds us that ambitious men and
women with political power have often used grand monuments to influence
the memories and cognitive frames of future generations. 470 As Levinson
writes, “[M]onuments are quintessentially ‘about time’ and who shall control
the meaning assigned to Proustian moments of past time.” 471 Norm Spaulding
writes of how memorials should invite perpetual remembrance and contested
467. Id. at 21.
468. Id. at 22.
469. Guido Calabresi, Conversation, “We Imagine the Past to Remember the Future”—Between Law, Economics, and Justice in Our Era and According to Maimonides, 26 YALE J.L. &
HUMANS. 135 (2014).
470. See LEVINSON, supra note 386, at 5.
471. Id. at 25.
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narratives: “The problem is . . . that in seeking to do justice to the past we long
for the very closure of judgment, along with its too-tidy hierarchical ordering
of authoritative evidence, that memories of irreparable injury can never be
expected to provide.” 472
It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a comprehensive guide to
precisely how we should better account for the inequalities in our collective
memories about the past: what “countermonuments” and memorials should
look like, 473 how schools should teach difficult history, 474 or what should be
done with monuments to the Confederacy. 475 But this Article has offered yet
another reason for why we should invest in a more egalitarian collective
memory, intentionally unshackled from past subordination. Refusing to detoxify our collective memory is not only a disservice to ourselves but an encouragement to continued assaults on victims of mass subordination.
CONCLUSION
History, despite its wrenching pain, [c]annot be unlived, but if faced [w]ith courage,
need not be lived again.
Maya Angelou 476
All your buried corpses now begin to speak.
James Baldwin 477

When institutions encounter physical manifestations of past horror, these
discoveries offer evidence, risk, and opportunity. Brutalized bodies, neglected
burial sites, and exploited photographs furnish evidence of how subordination
survives death. They tell stories of posthumous dehumanization, disrespect,
and the systemic denial of groups’ rightful role in shaping our nation’s collective memory. Moreover, with this evidence comes risk. Today’s actions and

472. Norman W. Spaulding, Resistance, Countermemory, Justice, 41 CRITICAL INQUIRY
132, 136 (2014).
473. See generally JAMES E. YOUNG, THE TEXTURE OF MEMORY: HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS
AND MEANING 45 (1993); Amy Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1107 (2005) (citing Spaulding, supra note 330, at 1195).
474. A recent report by the Southern Poverty Law Center revealed that “only 8 percent of
high school seniors can identify slavery as the cause of the Civil War,” that “68 percent[] don’t
know that it took a constitutional amendment to formally end slavery,” and that “[f]ifty-eight
percent of teachers find their textbooks inadequate” to addressing the topic of slavery. S.
POVERTY L. CTR., TEACHING HARD HISTORY: AMERICAN SLAVERY 9 (2018), https://www
.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/tt_hard_history_american_slavery.pdf [perma.cc/JV35-N9LF].
The report links the skewed history of American textbooks to the effective pro-Confederate campaigns a century ago.
475. See generally LEVINSON, supra note 386; Forman, supra note 392.
476. Maya Angelou, On the Pulse of Morning, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/21/us/the-inauguration-maya-angelou-on-the-pulse-of-morning.html
[perma.cc/3KEN-DKDJ].
477. I AM NOT YOUR NEGRO (Velvet Film 2017).
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omissions can facilitate the continued legal and social erasure of enslaved and
indigenous persons’ humanity.
Yet, these discoveries also offer opportunities to reject history’s invitation
to subvert the memory, will, and spiritual strivings of subordinated peoples.
We, the living, can take active steps to avoid complicity in past horrors. We
can honor the legacies of those who, through law and custom, were intentionally denied the right to leave their mark on our polity and consciousness. We
can seek to remediate indignities perpetuated against people who never received anything resembling a remedy. “[O]ut of a mountain of despair,” we
can extract “a stone of hope.” 478 While we can inflict wounds of indignity after
death, we also have the power to prescribe healing measures of justice.

478.

Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963).

